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Summary
Environmental responsibility involves a number of intricate moral questions that 
range from the problems of responsible co-operation in collective actions to the 
intriguing issues of our moral responsibility to non-humans. They pose a challenge to 
moral philosophy. The main objective of this thesis is to show a way of responding to 
tliis challenge. It does so in two complementaiy ways: firstly, by giving a critique of 
conventional approaches to environmental responsibility, and secondly, by 
developing an alternative, discursive approach. The thesis builds on the fundamental 
assumption that discourse ethics provides the conceptual framework and analytical 
tools that can enable us to deal satisfactorily with a full range of moral issues raised 
by environmental problems.
The thesis develops a discourse-ethical conception of environmental responsibility 
that has its rational foundation in the philosophical paradigm of communicative 
rationality. A post-conventional, universalistic conception of co-responsibility is 
groimded by reflection on the actual situation of practising communicative 
rationality, and explained in terms of normative contents, inherent in human 
communication by speech.
It is argued that the transfer of this original co-responsibility, revealed by reflexive 
foimding of discourse ethics, toward the answers to the novel task of environmental
responsibility should be fulfilled by a network of formal and informal dialogues and 
other foims of discursive enviromnental decision-making at all levels. The thesis sees 
public deliberation not merely as a mechanism for collective decision making but as a 
basic feature of practical rationality. It highlights the importance of deliberative 
processes for environmental policy making, and suggests a convergence between 
discourse ethics and deliberative social institutions. The fiinction of discourse ethics 
with regard to deliberative decision-making processes is seen in offering a normative 
model in teims of an ideal procedure of deliberation and decision making that should 
be reflected in social institutions as much as possible. The proceduie itself is 
characterised in terms of postulates that should provide a normative framework for 
reaching binding decisions that lie in the equal interest of all.
The thesis also discusses possible limitations of the discourse-ethical approach to 
environmental responsibility. The objection that the approach is severely limited 
since it is based on language as a human expression and therefore “hopelessly 
antlnropocentric” is discussed. The claim that the approach is unable to work the 
interests of non-humans into its framework in any meaningful way is, however, 
rejected. It is argued that, while the approach may remain anthi'opocentric, it offers a 
comprehensive and coherent perspective that allows us to address the whole range of 
environmental concerns. It is also argued that there are no a priori considerations in 
discoinse ethics that prevent the incorporation of concerns for other species and, 
indeed, the biosystem itself in a communicatively conceived idea of the good human 
life. On the other hand, by defending the possibility of rational discussion of the good
life and by specifying normative prerequisites for it, the discursive approach opens 
space for a normative discussion that might eventuate in a transformation of society 
and the radically different collective idea of the good life that might also incorporate 
a qualitatively new relationsliip with the natural world.
It is acknowledged that the discourse-ethical approach to enviromnental 
responsibility does, however, face some difficulties. The major limitation of the 
approach is located in its insistence on rational consensus as a constitutive 
presupposition and normative ideal of environmental discourse. Thus, the thesis gives 
an immanent critique of the approach that explores possibilities of constructing a 
more flexible and politically serviceable conception of rationally motivated 
agreement, without abandoning the fundamental ideas of discourse ethics.
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Introduction
The environmental crisis seems to be a good reason for rethinking and reassessing 
our relationship with the natural environment. The pollution of the land, the air, and 
the water, resource depletion, global warming, the ozone depletion, the extinction of 
species, and the destruction of the wilderness are some of the most striking examples 
of the environmental problems which have emerged as a result of our dealings with 
nature. But, although destructive aspects o f our intei-ventions in the natural 
environment were noticed a long time ago, it was only in the last decades that the 
enviromnental problems have been seen as ethical problems as well. Only recently 
we have become aware of the fact that the human interaction with the natinal 
environment also has important normative implications and raises moral questions 
analogous to those of the social relationships between human beings. These moral 
questions ar e generally understood as questions of our moral responsibility to nature. 
Yet, the question of moral responsibility towards nature seems to overstep the limits 
of traditional moral theory, and require a revision of conventional moral concepts. It 
appears that in the context of environmental affairs the question of moral 
responsibility manifests some novel aspects and difficulties which the conventional 
conception of morality cannot reflect adequately. These novel and distinctive features 
originate from the specific natme of the enviromnental problems, and they are 
summarised as follows.
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Firstly, in contrast to traditional moral problems which were situated, on the one 
hand, in the temporal imiverse of contemporaries and, on the other hand, in a 
restricted spatial horizon, most of the environmental problems are global, far- 
reaching and ftitui e-related. The extended spatial and temporal horizons of the actions 
and activities made possible by modern teclmology, and the accompanied loss of the 
immediate proximity between actors, impacts, and affected parties create a 
qualitatively new situation. In the world in which people are no longer isolated from 
each other by space and time, it becomes very difficult to imagine what the affected 
persons might have to suffer from our actions and activities. It appears that nowadays 
we are, with all our teclmologically multiplied power of encroaching into ecosystems, 
responsible for much more than we can observe, know or anticipate. Yet, can 
somebody be held responsible for something he or she did not, or even could not, 
anticipate? Now, it seems that the novel demand for taking over responsibility for the 
fliture and more remote consequences of the agent's activity (possible combined with 
the effect of the other people's actions or omissions) might amoimt to an indirect 
moral co-responsibility. Together with even more complex questions of indirect co­
responsibility related to the problems of synergistic and cumulative threshold effects 
of collective activities, this demand constructs a novel problem for moral theoiy. It 
camiot be dealt with satisfactorily by a type of ethics that only addresses the 
responsibility of single actors seen as private persons or of individuals in their 
professional roles within existing institutions.
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This becomes even more obvious when it is associated with another important aspect 
of the environmental problems, i.e. the collective nature of many enviromnentally 
harmful activities. There is a class of moral problems related to the fact that the 
enviromnental problems are mainly effects and side-effects of collective actions and 
activities. Due to the large number of actors who have a stake in collective 
enterprises, it becomes very difficult to identify and allocate individual 
responsibilities in the way that it has been done according to traditional ethics. At this 
point one should recall that, according to traditional morals, someone could be 
regarded as responsible only for actions that he or she could have been accoimtable 
for. But today, when collective and corporate forms of actions appear to dominate 
individual actions, and when their effects have global, cumulative and synergistic 
characteristics, it becomes extremely difficult to establish the individual's 
responsibilities for the state of affairs. Therefore, in the constellation of the 
environmental crisis^ problems of attributing and distributing responsibility for the 
effects and side-effects of collective activities, and the questions of responsible co­
operation between participants in collective actions have emerged as very important 
ethical problems. ^
Furthermore, it appears that the pressing- environmental problems invite 
considerations of the moral status of nature and raise a question whether such a 
thing as responsibility toward nature is independent o f  responsibility for the present and 
future hiunanity? Undoubtedly, the environmental problems we are facing today have
 ^ It should be said  that these problems are not novel but their importance is becoming increasingly 
apparent in our time.
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made clear that our increasing technological ability to dominate nature also carries 
increased responsibility for the results of our intei*ventions. Yet, what would be an 
appropriate ethical response to this situation is far from clear. Moreover, as 
Christopher Stone (1988) pointed out,
"...there is today a widespread feeling that our technology, our capacity to 
alter the earth and the relations thereon, is outstripping oiu ethics, our ability 
to provide satisfactory answers to how that power ought to be exercised."
It should be recalled here that the interaction between humans and their natural 
envirorunent has traditionally been outside the domain of ethics. Therefore, the 
question of responsibility for or toward the natural environment has not been 
addressed within the conventional ethical frameworks. Conventional moral theories 
have considered the relationship between human beings as the only appropriate 
subject for ethical deliberation, and, consequently, have held the view that human 
beings are the only proper objects of moral concern.^
However, in recent years considerable attention has been paid to the question of 
whether the enviromnental crisis requires an extended ethical perspective. Due to 
enormously increased teclmological power, our actions and activities affect not only 
human beings in the present but also future generations. They also affect other living 
beings critically and tlireaten to destabilise eco-systems and the biosphere. Since
 ^ Classical utilitarianism, though, extended moral concern to all beings capable o f  feeling pain and  
pleasure and hence included non-human sentient animals in its ethical constituency, c f  Bentham 
(1970).
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ethics is concerned with humans' actions and activities, some philosophers have 
suggested that these facts must be taken into account. They argue that the 
qualitatively new situation indicates that we, in fact, need ethics of much wider scope 
than traditional ethics.
To sum up, the classes of problems of moral responsibility mentioned above pose a 
challenge to moral philosophy. They ask for rethinldng of conventional moral 
concepts. As a philosophical endeavour, rethinking moral theory in the light of 
enviromnental problems faces two tasks. The first task is a critical examination of 
conventional moral frameworks to find out whether they are capable of dealing with 
the problems of moral responsibility raised by environmental issues. The second task 
is developing and defending rationally justifiable ethical alternatives, where 
necessary. The main objective of this project is to show a way of fulfilling these 
tasks. It will do so by developing an approach to the problems of environmental 
responsibility that stems from the discursive conception of ethics. The first chapter, 
therefore, outlines the basic ideas of discourse ethics.
II
Chapter 1 
Discourse Ethics
The transition from the traditional to the modern period in moral theory is marked by 
"a movement fr om the view that morality must be imposed on human beings towards 
the belief that morality could be understood as human self-governance or autonomy" 
(Schneewind, 1993). This stage culminates in deontological theories such as Kant’s 
critical theory of morality (Kant, 1785), and in a number of modern consequentalist 
theories, exemplified by the utilitarian moral theory of Jeremy Bentharn (1789). With 
the modem moral theories the justification of norms of social interaction was put on a 
new foundation. The novelty was the project to base normative or rational validity of 
moral principles and norms not on higher prescriptions derived from religious or 
metaphysical views, but on the autonomy of the person. The demand that morality be 
regarded as autonomous was expressed in the view that morality of actions should be 
determined by the agent’s rational will rather than something external to that will, 
such as the will of another (a king, the state, God.)
The autonomy of morality included the idea that a moral judgement can never depend 
for its coiTectness entirely on factors which are non-moral; that is, in justifying moral 
judgements one must have recourse to a moral principle, which must in turn be 
rationally grounded.
12
Chapter 1 Discourse Ethics
Both Utilitarianism and Kantianism claim to provide a universal fundamental 
principle of moral deliberation in terms of which one can judge if an act is morally 
right or wrong. For the utilitarian moral philosophy an act is morally right because of 
certain consequences it has. Bentham, for instance, holds that an act is morally right 
because it produces the greatest balance of happiness (or welfare) for society as a 
whole (compared with all its alternatives). He proposes the utilitarian principle- act so 
as to bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number- as a rational method 
for making moral judgements.
On the other hand, Kant introduces the categorical imperative^ as a moral principle by 
means of which norms of action can be tested for their moral worthiness. Kant 
fomiulates the categorical imperative as a principle that requires the universalizability 
of modes of action and maxims, or of the interests furthered by them. The underlying 
idea is that valid moral norms are ones which have the quality of fairness or 
impartiality, and that this quality can be expressed by a principle of universalisation. 
According to Kant, norms must be suitable for expression as “universal laws” in order 
to be justified in a moral sense.
A number of significant current moral theories have continued this project of 
establishing a basic principle of moral deliberation in terms of which the validity of 
moral norms can be decided. All share the intention of analysing the conditions for 
making moral judgements based solely on reasons. These moral theories offer
 ^ “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law" (Kant, 1949).
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different formulations of the principle of universalisation but the basic idea is the 
same. As a principle of justification, the universalisation principle is so designed to 
take into account the general character of valid moral noims. The principle is so 
conceived as to exclude as invalid any norm that could not meet with the qualified 
assent of all who are or might be affected by it.
Rawls's theory of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971) is probably the most influential 
current moral theory that continues this line of moral thinking. Rawls wants to ensure 
impartial consideration of all affected interests by putting the moral agent into a 
fictitious “original position” specially designed to derive principles of justice that 
would be acceptable for each member of society. Like Kant, Rawls analyses moral 
obligation, and thus the validity of moral principles and institutions, in terms of the 
idea that they can be rationally justified under conditions of impartial judgement. 
What appears as particulai'ly important is that the standpoint of impai’tiality is 
operationalised in such a way that every individual can undertake to justify basic 
norms on her own. For Kant the categorical imperative constitutes a test which each 
individual can solitarily cany out; that is, each asks herself if  she can will a proposed 
norm to be a universal law. Rawls's original position features rational egoists 
prudently contracting behind the veil of ignorance -again, a procedure that can itself 
be carried out monologically.
It is this “monological” feature that is problematic. Monological reflection as a 
process of judging the validity of moral norms always remains relative to the vantage
14
Chapter 1 Discourse Ethics
point and perspective of some and not all concerned. True impartiality, thus, belongs 
only to that standpoint from which one can generalise precisely those noims that can 
count on miiversal assent because they embody an interest common to all affected.
Therefore, the frindamental idea that norms must be suitable for expression as 
“imiversai laws” in order to be justified in a moral sense, the intuition on which most 
of moral theories are based, is by no means exhausted by the requirement that moral 
norms must take the form  of universal principles. Nor it is sufficient, for one person 
to test whether every other person in an identical position could will the adoption of 
such a norm. The intuition expressed in the idea of the generalizability of maxims as 
a way of justifying moral norms points beyond that. It indicates that valid norms must 
deserve recognition by all concerned in order to be justified in a moral sense.
Thus, in order to produce this intersubjective recognition of a moral noim it is not 
enough for the individual to reflect on whether she can assent to the nomi. What is 
required is a real process of moral argumentation in which the individuals concerned 
cooperate and become convinced of the validity of the norm. This, essentially 
discursive (dialogical), process of judging the validity (acceptability) of norms cannot 
be substituted by a form of private moral deliberation. Only an intersubjective 
process of real argumentation can convince the participants that the proposed norm 
embodies an interest common to all affected, and therefore is acceptable to all.
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At this point Discourse ethics developed by Jürgen Habermas (1971, 1982, 1984, 
1987, 1990, 1993, 1996) and Karl-Otto Apel (1972, 1980, 1987, 1989, 1993) comes 
into play. As a specific programme of meta-ethics and normative moral theory, 
discourse ethics does entail the idea of a co-operative discursive process as a way of 
groimding the validity of moral norms. In the conceptual framework of discourse 
ethics, the question of justification of moral norms is shifted from the solitary moral 
deliberation to the community of moral subjects in dialogue. According to discourse 
ethics, the appropriate viewpoint from which to understand normative justification is 
rather a dialogical one. This stems from the basic insight that justifiability of moral 
norms camiot be determined by monological reflection, but only tliiough discursively 
testing its claim to validity, i.e. tluough argumentation by those subject to the norm in 
question. Only a moral discourse actually caiTied out involving all those affected by a 
proposed norm can provide a means by which the norm can be tested for its moral 
worthiness. Normative justification is, therefore, tied to reasoned agreement among 
those subject to the norm in question, and understood in terms of the logic of moral 
aigumentation.
Discourse ethics has developed a procedural approach to moral justification. 
Habermas (1990) has formulated this procedural principle as:
"Only those noims may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of
all affected in their role as participants in a practical discourse."
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Hence, in the framework of discourse ethics, the meaning of the justification principle 
is no longer individual self-determination on behalf o f  all others, but rather the 
common establishing of the general interests by reciprocally taking the perspective of 
each individual. As Kettner (1993) has pointed out "instead of asking what an 
individual moral agent could, or would, will without self-contradiction to be a 
universal maxim for all, real people have to determine by engaging in uncoerced 
discourse which norms or normative institutional aiTangements can be freely willed 
by everyone concerned." This dialogical orientation is the distinctive feature of 
discourse ethics. Like Kanf s moral theory, discoiuse ethics attempts to establish a 
basic moral principle of moral deliberation and judgement in terms of which the 
validity of moral norms can be decided. But the dialogical orientation of discourse 
ethics imposes distinctive requirements on such a basic principle: Unlike the 
categorical imperative it cannot take the form of a principle of private moral 
deliberation. Habermas (1990) has expressed this dialogical reading of Kant's moral 
theory by replacing the categorical imperative with the principle of universalisation 
(U):
"(U) For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its general 
observance for the satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be 
acceptable to all."
The principle of universalisation (U) is central to discourse ethics. In general, moral 
principles of universalisation such as the Categorical imperative take a cognitive
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approach to morality, attempting to account for the intersubjective binding force we 
experience in normative claims as indicative of a moral objectivity or impartiality. 
Universalisation principles can thus be seen as reconstmctions of the objectivity of 
the moral point of view. As a dialogical principle, however, the discourse ethical 
universalisation principle (U) finds adequate employment only in a real discourse. 
Strictly speaking, it does not allow the solitary theorist to produce universally valid 
moral norms as Kant thought he could with the Categorical Imperative. Habermas 
maintains that only a universalisation principle along the above lines malces a fiTiitfiil 
dialogue over moral norms possible.
The discourse ethical principle of universalisation (U) amounts to something like a 
necessary condition, for the broader discourse-ethical project o f grounding the 
validity of moral norms in the uncoerced agreement of all those affected. The 
principle of universalisation (U) elucidates what it means to discuss whether a moral 
norm ought to be adopted, and what those involved in argumentation must suppose of 
themselves if they are to consider a consensus they reach as rationally motivated. The 
intention of the latter is to thematise the pragmatically unavoidable presuppositions 
o f argumentation, i.e. what anyone who seriously engages in ar gument must at least 
tacitly suppose of both herself and those she is trying to convince, if a consensus is to 
be called “rationally motivated”. Alexy (1989) describes the pragmatic 
presuppositions of such a commitment as follows:
“Whoever justifies something at least pretends, as far as the justifying
discourse is concerned, to accept the other as an equal dialogue partner and
18
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neither to exercise coercion himself nor to support his position on a coercion 
exercised by others. He claims, in addition to be able to defend his assertion 
...against anyone.”
According to discourse ethics the contents of pragmatic presuppositions of 
argumentation in fact, reveal the intuitive knowledge of competent members of 
modem societies as to what constitutes a valid argument. Discourse ethics expresses 
them as rules of discourse or argumentation. The aim is to describe our intuition 
about what it means to be in a communicative situation in which a conflict would be 
resolved solely by the force of better argument. For this reason, discourse ethics 
speaks of an ideal communicative or speech situation in which a rationally motivated 
agreement or consensus could be attained. The discourse rules must ensure that all 
other motives of the participants in argumentation must give way when they clash 
with the motive of co-operatively reaching a consensus. The rules, which are 
constitutive of an ideal speech situation, are as follows:
"(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed 
to take part in a discourse.
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into 
the discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and 
needs.
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(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion,
from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2)." (Habermas,
1990)
The point of the first rule, (3.1) which might be called a “universality” rule is to open 
the discourse to all rational agents who have competence on the issue. As it stands, 
this rule leaves open who counts as “rational” or “competent”. The second rule (3.2) 
secures symmetrical chance at participation and the opemiess of the participants, 
while the third (3.3) requires conditions of communication ruling out repression of 
the rights accorded in the first two rules.
The rules can be reformulated in this way: Whoever aims to justify a norm 
discursively is committed to a discourse that (a) is open to all competent speakers on 
the issue; (b) provides its participants with symmetrical chances to introduce and 
problematize assertion, and to express their needs and wishes; and (c) is subject to 
neither internal nor external coercion. Although these rules are fonnulated somewhat 
generally, it cannot be denied that they are most plausible for modern pluralist 
settings, where one finds conflicts of interest thematized as such and open to 
normative regulation. In any case, the basic idea is to spell out what paificipants must 
suppose of each other if they are to consider their consensus a rationally motivated 
one. No doubt these suppositions are always to some extent coimterfactual; if one did 
not make them, however, one could hardly talce seriously our everyday intuitions 
about the effort to convince. Moreover, as soon as one discovers that a consensus did
20
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not even approximately fulfil the above rules, the rationally binding character of its 
results becomes questionable. That is, one can hardly consider the acceptance of a 
norm (regulating a potential conflict of interests) to be based on an insight into the 
norm’s intrinsic validity if its justification depends on the systematic exclusion of 
certain viewpoints and possible objections- whether such exclusion is based on 
external force, denying voice to some of those expected to obey the norm, or the 
participant’s own distorted self-perceptions.
As a transformation of Kant's ethics, discourse ethics has features which characterise 
most types of moral theory of Kantian provenance: it is deontological, cognitivist, 
formalist, and universalist (Habermas, 1990). More important perhaps than the 
characteristics mentioned above, which discourse ethics shares with a number of 
other moral theories derived from the Kantian tradition, is a structural feature: 
discourse ethics is "a two-stage ethics" (Apel, 1987). On the theoretical or 
philosophical level, discourse ethics limits its domain to questions of right or just 
action. Discourse ethics differentiates between three distinct kinds of practical 
questions- pragmatic, ethical, and moral, regarding only the last ones to be the proper 
domain of moral theory (Habermas, 1993). So, Habeimas views pragmatic questions 
as the technical issue of appropriate strategies and techniques for satisfying our 
contingent desires, the issue that remains within the horizon of strategic rationality. 
On the other hand, ethical issues address the questions of what is good for me or for 
us or for them, which inevitably remain embedded in the social and historical context 
of a particular culture and a particular community. Neither pragmatic nor ethical
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questions can be answered in universally valid terms, and the scope of the correlative 
notions of practical rationality- respectively, the strategic and the prudential- is 
coiTespondingly limited. In contrast to them, morality is concerned with "the question 
of the norms according to which we want to live together and of how practical 
conflicts can be settled in the common interest of all" (Habermas, 1993). This 
question of the just regulation of social interaction is amenable to universally valid 
consensual regulation. Moral questions, according to Habermas (1993), are so 
structined that they can be resolved in the equal interest of all and transcend the 
culture-specific horizon. Obviously, discourse ethics excludes from its purview much 
of what has traditionally been regarded as specifically ethical matters. This results 
from the conviction that the irreducible pluralism of modem life does not admit a 
general ethical theory. In McCaithy's words, "to suppose that all the questions of the 
good life dealt with under the rubric of classical ethics- questions of happiness and 
virtue, character and ethos, community and tradition- could be answered once and for 
all, and by philosophers, is no longer plausible" (McCarthy, 1990). This does not 
mean that ethical deliberation is irrational. This is just to say that under modem 
conditions of life with its pluralism of different conceptions of the good and various 
rival value orientation, the ethical question "How should 1 (we) live?" cannot be 
abstracted from culturally specific notions of the good life, and therefore cannot have 
a universally valid answer. However, it does not preclude a universal theory of a 
much narrower sort, namely a theory of justice. Thus discourse ethics commits itself 
to the question of justice, trying to establish the moral point of view as the 
perspective from which practical conflicts can be fairly and impartially settled.
22
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The moral point of view from wliich we can judge practical questions impartially is 
indeed open to different inteipretations. But, discourse ethics attempts to show that 
because the moral point of view is grounded in the communicative structure of 
rational discourse as such, it forces itself intuitively on anyone who is at all open to 
this reflective form of conununicative action (Habermas, 1993). Thus the normative 
principles presupposed by communicative acts provide the basis for reconstructing a 
moral point of view. This implies that it is possible to take recourse in a conception of 
practical rationality that is different from prudential rationality as well as from 
strategic rationality. Discourse ethics attempts to show that morality has its rational 
foundation in the philosophical paradigm of communicative rationality. 
Communicative rationality is a normative concept that discourse ethics regards as a 
universal normative principle. According to discourse ethics the whole purpose of 
commimication is to build mutual understanding in order to construct a consensual 
social reality. This appears to be an aspect of our species’ evolution, rooted in a 
biological predisposition and now solidified in the very structure of speech 
(Habermas, 1984). Our natinal capacity for language contains the normative force of 
communicative rationality, which is: to commimicate with the intention of reaching 
mutual understanding and agreements exclusively via the force of better argument.
Habermas (1984; 1987) denotes action oriented toward reaching an understanding of 
an initially uncleai* situation with the goal of co-ordinating action consensually 
tlirough persuasive argumentation as “communicative action”. In communicative
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action, language operates as an instrument for co-ordination and co-operation. 
Habermas (1984) has demonstrated that in the communicative model of action, 
speech acts are the medium in which actors who are oriented toward a co-operative 
co-ordination of their individual actions "mobilise the potential for rationality" 
inherent in ordinary language. Thus, he argues, the communicative model can 
illuminate the "rational internal structure" of the process of coming to an 
intersubjectively valid agreement. This "rational internal structure" of communicative 
action provides a basis for the reconstitution of a moral point of view. According to 
discourse ethics, moral judgements serve to explain how conflicts of action can be 
settled on the basis of rationally motivated agreement. If morality has a rational core 
at all, then that core will have to manifest itself in the ideas that govern our 
procedures for discursively reaching consensus about the morally obligatory course 
of action.
After this introduction of fiindamental ideas of discourse ethics, let us now consider 
how morally binding norms regulating the interaction between humans and the 
natural environment can be rationally established and justified, and what discourse 
ethics has to say with regard to this problem.
24
Chapter 2 
Grounding Environmental Responsibility
The idea of grounding moral responsibility for the environment involves a discursive 
process of finding good reasons to malce moral agents see that there are certain 
responsibilities to/for the environment which they are personally not aware existed, to 
make them acknowledge that they have those responsibilities, and to malce them 
accept that they ought to be acting so as to fulfil the responsibilities they 
acknowledge to have. How environmental responsibility can be rationally grounded 
is an intricate question. As indicated in the introduction, it includes, for instance, the 
problems of responsible co-operation and co-ordination in collective actions as well 
as some intriguing issues such as the question of our moral responsibility to non­
humans.
Collective Action Problems
One of the most important aspects of environmental responsibility is probably its 
collective nature. Let us, therefore, first turn to the issue of environmental 
responsibility in the light of moral problems posed by collective actions and 
activities. The crucial question in this context seems to be: How can it be shown by
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rational arguments that we ought to be responsible for the establishment and keeping 
of those novel agreements by which we could change our collective activities as a 
response to the challenge of the ecological crisis?
Yet, the demand of talcing over responsibility for the environmental effects and side- 
effects of collective activities- e.g. economic, technical, and political activities- may 
indeed appear almost unreasonable from the point of view of a single person. For 
although an individual may be prepared to change her personal way of life by 
adopting a new attitude toward the natural environment, she may nevertheless feel 
completely powerless with regard to the novel tasks of collective responsibility. This 
feeling of powerlessness of the individual may relate to both the necessary knowledge 
about probable impacts of collective activities and the practical initiatives to be taken 
with regard to the on-going long-term collective activities of the society.
At this point, the well-loiown problems of the disparity which prevail between the 
action intentions of the single actors and the outcome of collective activities on the 
level of groups, institutions and society come into play. These are not novel 
problems, indeed. The dialectics of individual rational behaviour and private virtues, 
on the one hand, and collective outcomes, on the other hand, has been recognised and 
analysed for a long time, in economics for instance, at least since Adam Smith. In his 
"An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (published in 1776) 
Adam Smith presents the theory that under certain conditions the promotion of one’s 
own goals is the best means of attaining the common good, at least in the economic
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Sphere. He advocates the freedom of entrepreneurs to promote their own interest, that 
is, their profits, by suitable (as they saw it) methods of production, hiring, sales and 
so forth, on the grounds that such a general arrangement would best promote the good 
of the whole community. On Smith’s views, the advance by each entrepreneur of his 
or her own interest, unimpeded by legal or self-imposed moral constraints to protect 
the good of others, would at the same time lead to the most efficient promotion of the 
common good. This would happen. Smith believed, because there is “an invisible 
hand” which co-ordinates these many otherwise uncoordinated individual economic 
activities.
Yet, in the case of enviromnental problems such as global warming, brought about by 
ever-increasing economic activities of modern society, the invisible hand seems to 
fail to direct individually rational agents to optimal outcomes, which is not siuprising. 
Atomistic mdividualism of Adam Smith’s philosophy based on the idea that 
economic activity consists wholly of mutually agreed-upon transactions between 
individuals appears to be not only inaccurate in the face of the corporate complexity 
of today’s business world, but also naive in its supposition that universally beneficent 
outcomes would come about spontaneously as by an invisible hand from countless 
individual acts whose agents have no thought of their collective (systemic) effects.
In our day rational choice theory conceptualised the problems that exist whenever 
rational individual actions fail to produce a rational outcome for society as “collective 
action problems” (Hardin, R.; 1982). Mathematical game theory through its
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application to the strategic games of human interaction (i.e. competition and co­
operation) has more thoroughly analysed the "dilemmas" and "social traps" into 
which the means-ends-rationality of the single actors can lead on the level of social 
results (Colman, 1982).
Since “collective action problems” pertain to the issues of enviromnental 
responsibility, we should look more carefiilly at the underlying structure these 
problems share. A challenge for moral philosophy posed by the collective action 
problems is to show us how to act in order to achieve responsible co-operation in the 
environmental realm, given the nonsolidarity of competition, and incentives that each 
participant has in defecting from the joint plan of action.
II
Collective Action and Environmental Responsibility
As indicated in the introduction, environmental problems are often collective; that is, 
large nimibers of actors have a stake in them. In this strategic situation, a problem for 
moral philosophy occurs when what is individually rational conflicts with what is 
best for all. The two most familiar* classes of collective action problems arising in the 
environmental realm are “the tragedy of the commons” and the underprovision of 
public goods.
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The “tragedy of the commons” is the term coined by Hardin (1968) for a situation 
that often obtains under a regime of common property. The expression denotes a 
situation in which the choice of individually rational strategies by independent actors 
leads to a socially iiTational outcome. In his article Hardin describes the way in which 
the tragedy of the commons develops.
“Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try 
to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may 
work reasonable satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching and 
disease keep the niunbers of both man and beast well bellow the carrying 
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the 
day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality...the 
rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is 
to add another animal to his herd. And another...But this is the conclusion 
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is 
the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his ovra best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin 
to all”.
Examples offered by Hardin of the tragedy in operation are environmental pollution, 
the national rangelands in the Western United States, and American national parks. 
Hardin, however, was not the first to notice the tragedy of the commons. Aiistotle, for
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instance, wrote in his Politics, (book II), :"Wliat is common to the greatest number 
has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all 
of the common interest". Yet, it was Hardin’s expression that has become a very 
popular metaphor for the environmental degradation to be expected whenever many 
individuals use a common property resource.
A system of common property exists when large numbers of individuals are allowed 
unrestricted access to a resource. Many of the environmental goods are common 
property resources, for instance ocean fisheries, groundwater basins, grazing areas 
etc. Ozone in the stratosphere, for example, is a common property resource currently 
being depleted as a by-product of the use of fluorocarbon chemicals. The atmosphere 
as a whole could be regarded as a kind of commons: each individual burner of fossil 
fuels uses up a small portion of its capacity to absorb carbon dioxide content, 
thinking little of her contribution to the greenhouse effect and climatological change. 
At the largest scale, it is meaningful to spealc of the earth’s resources in their totality 
as a kind of “global commons”.
The essence of a common property resource lies in rights to use the resource 
separated from the responsibility for maintaining its quality. The consequences are 
that rational, self-interested actors will each attempt to maximise their “take” from 
the resource, believing that if they fail to do so then other actors will receive the 
reward of intensified use. Each actor receives the entire benefit of her own increased
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use, but shares the costs of that increase with all other actors. Further, it appears that 
the rational actors do not have any incentive to improve the overall quality of the 
resource; any such investment would produce benefits shared by all the users, with 
costs falling totally on the investor. The overall result is overuse and depletion of the 
resource.
Collective action problems also arise in the case of public goods, which must be 
supplied to large numbers of people simultaneously if they are to be supplied at all. 
An individual may reason that if  the public good is produced by the participation of 
many actors, she will benefit from it regardless of whether she contributes or not. 
Wlienever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each 
person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts 
of others. This attitude is economically rational because any contribution that an 
individual gives will make virtually no difference to the amount of the good she 
receives. If they are economically rational, all potential beneficiar ies of the good will 
thinlc in the same terms. The problem is that if all participants choose to free-ride then 
the public or collective good will not be produced. Within the area of enviromnental 
concerns, examples of public goods include: the integrity of the ecosphere; biotic 
diversity, the quality of the global atmosphere and the oceans; and the condition of 
local environments.
The underprovision of public goods is well analysed by Mancur Olson. In his “The 
logic of collective action” (Olson, 1965), the free rider problem in economics is the
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starting point for an analysis designed to explain the siiboptimal levels of provision of 
collective goods in market societies. His analysis of the “free-rider problem” has 
shown difficulties that result from the cost/benefit calculations of the participants in 
collective action aimed to promote the public good. Olson has investigated how, in 
collective action situations, contributing to the provision of a collective good 
becomes rational because of the fact that simultaneously some private good may be 
obtained or some private harm may be avoided. This is called the provision of 
“selective incentives”. He has applied the same logic of collective action to politics 
and come to the conclusion that the risk of defection explains compulsory taxation, 
military service, etc. (Olson, 1965).
Environmental theorist Ophuls (Ophuls, 1973; 1976) has linked Olson’s formulation 
of the free-rider problem to Hardin’s concern with commons. There, too, individuals 
may calculate that they are best off if they can avoid payment but still enjoy the good. 
If too many defect in this manner, the good will not be supplied. In any case because 
of the risk of defection and the inevitable presence of undetected free-riders, public 
goods tend to be imdersupplied. Ophuls utilises “the logic of collective action” to 
justify a strong state intervention in the environmental sphere. By mapping the 
tragedy of the commons onto the free-rider problem (though significantly, Olson did 
not so extend his analysis) Ophuls argues that coercive authority in environmental 
realm is justified to eliminate free-riders whose presence is inevitable since the 
provision of public environmental goods follows the logic of collective action.
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Both the tragedy of the commons and public good undeiprovision pose an intricate 
question of responsible co-operation between participants in collective actions. In the 
environmental realm, the need for co-ordination and co-operation stems directly from 
the “collective” nature of many environmental problems. These problems share an 
underlying structure which may be represented in the famous “prisoner’s dilemma” 
game (Hardin, 1982). The reason for the title of the game is that its usual exposition 
is in terms of the choices facing two prisoners who are kept in different cells but ar e 
accused of a joint crime: each is faced with the choice of confessing (and implicating 
the other) or remaining silent.
The options and outcomes are so constructed that it is rational for each person, when 
deciding in isolation, to pursue a course which each finds to be against his or her 
interests and therefore uTational. John Dryzek (Dryzek,1987) and Peter Danielson 
(Danielson, 1993) have given good illustrations of enviromnental problems expressed 
as the prisoner’s dilemma.
Danielson analyses global wanning from the point of view of rational decision 
theory. He claims that global warming shares the same structure as “the tragedy of 
the commons” which is clearest in the abstract form of a two-player game. According 
to Danielson, there is a wide recognition that global warming has the following 
strategic structure which he calls the Greenhouse dilemma:
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“Each of us has two alternatives: to burn less or more cheap fuel. Why call 
this situation a dilemma? First, I consider what I can do independently of your 
decision. We shall see that this is particularly easy in this case, as the same
action is best for me regardless of what you do. If you bum less, I do better
(...) by burning more as I gain the advantage of cheap diily fuel. Alternatively, 
should you burn more, I also should burn more (bad is better than worst; 
mutual profligacy is better than one-sided conservation). Since you must 
either burn more or less, we have what appears to be a conclusive logical 
argument for the rationality of my choosing to burn more. This is the first 
horn of the dilemma. The other horn considers the symmetry of our situation, 
which makes it rational for you to do what I do. It would be better for us both 
to burn less, if we could act together. But so long as we act independently, the 
first argument is conclusive, and rational individual agents end up with their 
third best outcome.“
In the Greenliouse dilemma, rational agents face a compliance problem; how to 
achieve joint co-operation without being taken advantage of. However, according to 
Danielson, the problem resists some simple moral appeals. It is obvious to everyone 
that mutual co-operation (in this case, universal reduction in emissions) is good for
all. It is certainly uncontroversially better, by each agent’s values, than joint
defection.
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How, then should we act in order to achieve the good of joint co-operation, given the 
strategic temptation and dangers that partially conflicting interests present? Danielson 
claims that those widely recommended moral principles such as Utilitarian or Kantian 
principles of universalisation camiot provide the morally coiTCCt basis for action. In 
the Greenhouse dilemma, both Utilitarianism and Kantianism would agree that moral 
agents ought unconditionally to cooperate. Utilitarianism, for instance, generates its 
recommendations by summing benefits across parties; co-operation leads to higher 
sums. Universalisation considers what happens if all do the same, excluding the 
possibility of asymmetrical action. But, Danielson argues, unconditional co-operation 
encourages others to exploit the morally constrained agent. From a strategic point of 
view, botli of these widely recommended moral principles are utopian. He concludes 
that problems like the Greenliouse dilemma reveal the failure of widely accepted 
theories of morality and suggests how we might improve moral principles so that they 
pass this strategic test. Firstly, since imconditional co-operation appears to be foolish, 
rationally successful moral principles must be responsive to the other agents. A moral 
agent needs, at the same time, to protect herself from exploitation and to encourage 
others to respond to her by adopting moral constraints. And secondly, the best way to 
achieve mutual, responsive co-operation is to communicate one’s commitment by 
transparent principles. Thus, Danielson argues that properly designed moral 
principles can solve some Prisoner’s Dilemmas. His solution for the two-agent 
Greenhouse dilemma, is: “I ought to burn less if and only if you are similarly publicly 
committed to burning less. In cases like this, it is rational to be moral.” (Danielson, 
1993)
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John Dryzek shares the view that collective action problems concerned with common 
property and public good have an underlying cause which may be represented by the 
“prisoner’s dilemma” game. His exposition of the problem is as follows. Two persons 
(A and B) are deciding whether or not to contribute to the provision of clean air in the 
neighbourhood where they both live. Assume there exists some common metric for 
the measurement of both the benefit yielded by clean air and the cost to both persons 
of maldng a contribution. One can then compute a measure of net benefit (or payoff) 
to A by subtracting “cost to A” fiom “benefit to A of cleaner air”. A similar measure 
can be computed for B. Dryzek suggests, as an illustrative example, that we further 
assume that: the cost of one player’s contribution to clean air = 7 units; the benefit 
provided by one contribution = 4 units, and the benefit provided by two contributions 
= 10 units”. Then we have a strategic situation in which if player A contributes (co­
operates) and B does not (B defects), then the payoff to A is (4-7)=-3, while the 
payoff to B is (4-0)=4. If neither contributes, the payoff is zero to both. If both 
contribute, the payoff is (10-7)=3 to both. The possibilities are diagrammed in the 
four cell in figure 1.
Diyzek deduces that from A’s perspective things look like this. If B defects, then A 
should defect too, in order to avoid the (-3) loss. On the other hand, if B co-operates, 
A should still defect, in order to achieve a payoff of 4 rather than 3. So, whatever B 
does, A should defect. From B’s perspective, the game looks exactly the same. 
Therefore both A and B will defect, and they end up in the lower right-hand cell, with
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a net benefit of zero to each. Clearly, both would prefer to be in the top left-hand cell, 
where both are 3 units better off. Therefore, Dryzek concludes: “Herein lies the 
paradox of the prisoner’s dilemma: individually rational choices lead to collectively 
bad outcomes.” (Dryzek, 1987)
Player B
cooperate defect
cooperate A =3 A=-3
Player A B=3 B = 4
defect A=4 A =0
B=-3 B=0
figure 1 
Prisoner‘s dilemma game
However, Dryzek acknowledges that the two-person game is an oversimplification of 
common property and public good collective action problems. He suggests that a 
more accurate representation is an “n-person” prisoner’s dilemma. The n-person case 
differs from the two-person case in that any harm caused by defection is spread over 
many players, no one player may know what all the others are doing, and signals to 
other players are diffuse (Dawes, 1980). In general, the larger the number of players 
involved, the greater the temptation to “free ride” on the efforts of others, and the less
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the chance of being caught. Diyzek argues that public good underprovison and the 
tragedy of the commons both represent a failure of co-ordination across actors and 
that co-ordination demands some kind of solution to the prisoner’s dilemma.
Collective action problems represented by the above explanatory models raise the 
question of responsible co-ordination and co-operation. As it has already been noted, 
a task for moral philosophy is to show how to act in order to achieve responsible co­
operation, given the non-solidarity of competition, or even egotistic parasitism of the 
other actors.
Yet, in posing the question of moral co-responsibility for the effects of collective 
activities, we may call to mind , by retrospection into the history of moral philosophy, 
that for a long time there have been institutional devices for dealing with the 
problems of collective responsibility, for example, contracts and associations like the 
state-under-law and even agreements and associations between states. In early days 
human societies coped with the problems of collective actions and activities by co­
operation and association. Thus, archaic institutions of collective responsibility came 
about. Furthermore, since the time of the Ancient Greeks people have explicitly asked 
the question as to the ethical-nonnative foundation of institutions and set themselves 
the task of gromiding institutions, as for example, the state and its laws by contracts.
In the modern period very sophisticated philosophical theories o f  the social contract 
have been developed and in these theories the problem of collective responsibility
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was explicitly thematised. Much of the attractiveness of the social contract approach 
is that it seems to provide simple and relevant answers to the question of responsible 
co-operation between participants in collective actions. In these theories, agreements 
and contracts about rules or norms of action the obedience of which is enforced by 
sanctions, especially by those of law, are regarded as usefiil devices for enforcing co­
ordination of co-responsible actions.
In particular in Thomas Hobbes’s classical theory o f social contract,a special problem 
of collective responsibility (later to be named “the free-rider problem”) was posed and 
to some extent even solved. Hobbes (Hobbes, 1651) analyses the problem of the risk 
faced by the individual actors to become the losers in taking over coresponsibility for 
the common cause, given the interest each has in defecting from the joint plan of 
action. The solution for this problem, proposed by Thomas Hobbes consisted of 
putting restriction on everybody’s egoistic claims by a social contract in connection 
with a govermnental contract which was to ensure the keeping of the social contract 
by the sanctioned power of the sovereign. Subsequently, the structural point of this 
solution to the problem of the risk of responsible co-operation in a society of 
competing egoists and potential “free-riders” was refined by some contemporary 
theorists, and put into the context of enviromnental issues.
GaiTet Hardin’s work (Hardin, 1968; 1972), for instance, though not explicitly 
contractarian in orientation, is probably one of the most famous attempts to think of 
enviroimiental issues in the hobbesian tradition. As Goodin (Goodin, 1994) has rightly
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pointed out, Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” is merely a special case of Thomas 
Hobbes “war of all against all”. In both theories the same problem of responsible co­
operation in a society of competing rational agents acting in their self-interest is 
examined. Both theories emphasise that rational pursuit of individual self-interest 
leads to overall outcomes which are worse for each individual concerned than other 
outcomes which are collectively obtainable. Hobbes suggested that the most 
favourable common results and prosperity for all can be obtained only if backed by 
the “sword of sovereign”. Hardin, on the other hand, recommends a model of “mutual 
coercion mutually agreed upon” in which the individual’s right to encroach on the 
commons is replaced by a system of centralised controls (Hardin, 1968).
Hardin’s model is by no means the only contemporary theoretical model applied to 
the environment that follows the logic of Hobbes’s “Leviathan”. William Ophuls’ 
(Ophuls, 1973; 1976, ) work, for instance, represent a systematic neo-hobbesian 
response to the environmental crisis. His central claim is that scarcity of natural 
resources will create severe stresses on the economic and political scene of the 
western society and put its suiwival in jeopardy. Only strong governmental action will 
be able to contain these stresses. That regime will quite possibly be unjust and 
oppressive but people will only be reasonable if they Icnow that the risk of coercion 
exists. Therefore, govermnental action in the environmental sphere must be 
strengthened, if necessary by greater resort to force. Here, the common line of 
argument that assimilates Ophuls and Hardin to Hobbes becomes apparent. The same 
problem of collective responsibility that gives rise to the need for the state at all gives
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rise to the need for strong state intervention in the environmental sphere. Ophuls even 
refers directly to Hobbes by claiming that environmental problems force us to choose: 
Leviathan or Oblivion (Ophuls, 1973),
Over the past decades, this (Hobbesian) approach has benefited from considerable 
formalization. The problem of responsible co-operation of participants in collective 
actions reappears within public finance as one of securing uncoerced contribution 
toward the provision of “public good”. Since each potential beneficiary waits for 
others to pay for the provision of public goods the result is that no one does pay. 
Hence there is radical underprovison of goods, so that each would have been better off 
if coerced into paying for public goods. Within welfare economic terms, this is just a 
special case of “externalities”: everyone tries to pass off as many costs of their 
activities onto others, whilst those others are trying to do the same. Again, everyone 
would be better off under a regime wherein none could impose external costs on 
others; but given the incentive each has to defect from that arrangement some external 
agency is required to enforce it. The standard way for that sovereign external agency 
to force internalization of externalities is through taxes, charges and other price 
signals. In fact, this is an old theme in economics, well developed in the literature of 
environmental economics (Pearce et al., 1989). All those formalizations point to the 
same Hobbesian need for “mutual coercion” and strong state enforcement of 
collective advantageous arrangements.
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The analysis of the collective responsibility problems offered by Hobbes and his 
many successors in our days throws light on the question: Can individuals who 
pursue their self-interests come to agree upon a set of collective arrangements, the 
result of which will be in the public interest or a good for all? It is important to note 
that the explanatory models offered by Hobbes and, in more sophisticated forms, by 
many contemporary theorists such as rational decision theorists, share the same 
underlying philosophical assumptions. In all of them rational agents are motivated by 
self-interests, and the rationality of action is coiTcspondingly conceptualised as the 
efficient linking of actions-seen-as-means to the attainment of individual goals. Such 
models postulate a lack of enforced co-operation; and to avoid the undesirable 
outcomes, the actors in the action need to be forced into co-operation by a system of 
rules.
The findings of their analysis appear to have important ethical implications, since 
they elucidate what sort of co-operative action can be expected among individuals 
who share an attachment to strategic rationality, however divergent their other basic 
values might be.
The next sections scrutinise the philosophical foundations of this model, specifically 
its concept of rationality. In what follows it is argued that the novel problems of 
taking over and bearing coresponsibility for the effects of collective actions pose an 
ethical problem that is by no means explained by the theoretical models based on 
strategic rationality.
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III
Strategic Rationality and Environmental Responsibility
In the strategic models the whole problem of responsible co-operation and co­
ordination in collective actions is reduced to one of instrumental-technical rationality. 
From a moral point of view it important to note that in these models the problems 
such as the prisoner’s dilemma or free-rider provide a basis for the generation of the 
institution of morality-or, at least, of prudent co-operation. Emergence of collectively 
accepted arrangements is explained by rationally calculated self-interests, and these 
mutually advantageous conventions are seen as providing a ‘moral’ code, even 
though that code is ‘generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premises of 
rational-choice’ (Gauthier; 1986).
The solution to the problem of responsible co-operation and co-ordination offered by 
the strategic models may therefore be reduced to the following thesis: Value-neutral, 
instrumental, or rather strategical rationality, put in the service of well-understood 
self-interest, may generate mutually advantageous aiTangements and thus in fact solve 
the problem.
One could analyse this approach as being based on a combination of four elementary 
assumptions:
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1. the assumption of rationality in the sense of a value-free faculty of calculating all 
kinds of consequences of given premises,
2. the assumption of action as the intentional, self-interested behavioiu* of individuals 
in an objectivated vyorld, that is, one in which objects and other individuals are 
related to in terms of their possible manipulation,
3. the assumption of rational agents as egoistic, utility maximizers,
4. the assumption of self-interest as a universalizable motivation that can explain a 
larger fraction of collective behaviour.
Now, as a consequence of these presuppositions, morality is understood as nothing 
but the constraints on themselves that rational self-interested people would agree to 
accept as the minimum price that has to be paid in order to obtain the co-operation of 
others. Responsible behaviour appears to be rational prudence pursued in a context 
where the co-operation (or at least forbearance) of other people is a condition of our 
being able to get what we want. It should be noticed as a feature of this approach that 
no special motive for behaving morally other than self-interest has to be invoked. 
Social (intersubjective) validity of moral norms as a minimum demand of morality is 
derived from the long-term self-interest of each individual rather than from respect or 
any inherent concern for the interests of others.
By combining the above mentioned presuppositions, the forebear of this approach, 
Thomas Hobbes, derives his so-called natiual laws, which he equates with the 
principles of Moral Philosophy (Hobbes, 1651):
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1. to seek peace and keep it,
2. to restrict one’s natural right to all things, if others are also prepared to do so, and 
insofar as it is necessary for the sake of peace and self-defence, and
3. to keep concluded contracts.
As is well Icnown, it is on the basis of these natural laws grounded by a rationally 
calculated self-interest that, according to Hobbes the social contract may be morally 
grounded as well as explained with regard to its emergence.
It is clear that the principles of morality like Hobbes’s natural laws are nothing but 
“hypothetical imperatives” or “advices of Prudence” in the sense of Kant. Their 
validity is always dependent on the preservation of self-interest as the last normative 
instance. Thus, the crucial question in our context is whether this way of rational 
grounding of moral norms is sufficient to secure their intersubjective validity, and 
thereby to ensure safe, advantageous, and credible moral commitments .
An answer initially could be that the intersubjective validity of moral norms is 
guaranteed insofar as one may suppose an equality of human beings at least with 
regard to the supposition of rationality as a faculty of calculating consequences. Of 
course, rationality could be defective in the single case and, precisely for this reason, 
which may also be calculated in advance, the mutually advantageous arrangements 
(such as Hardin’s “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon”) must include a contract of
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subjection to an external agency (a “sovereign” in Hobbes’s theory) who guarantees 
that the agreed norms are followed by everybody.
However, even if we suppose a perfect rationality of human beings in the sense of 
faculty of calculating, would it suffice to ground the validity of moral principles? For 
example, is it rational, in any strategic sense to conclude and keep contracts? It seems 
that the answer to this question could only be that it is indeed rational on these 
premises to be interested in concluding contracts in general, and in other people’s 
keeping them. Furthermore, it is rational to keep contracts oneself as long as one’s 
interest is satisfied by an existing contract and a breach could be followed by 
sanctions. But it is not rational, on premises of strategic rationality, to keep contracts 
in those situations where one could break them without miming the risk of negative 
consequences and where one could, by breaking a contract, draw a parasitic suiplus- 
advantage from other’s people’s keeping the contract. Rather it is rational, from a 
piuely strategical point of view, to enter into all contracts with a “criminal 
reservation” (proviso) for eventualities of the latter type. In addition, it is not rational 
either, on these premises, to abstain from concluding favourable contracts that happen 
to be agreements at the cost of other people who are not participating in but affected 
by these agreements.
Reduction of the whole problem of grounding norms to the problem of instrumental 
rationality is evident in strategic models from Hobbes to the contemporary 
approaches which understand morality as “mutually advantagous” conventions. This
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applies to the attempts to ground environmental responsibility in strategic rationality 
as well. They, indeed, face the same problems.
Consider here the normative principle supposed to establish environmental 
responsibility in the case of Global Warming that was proposed by Danielson: “I 
ought to burn less if and only if you are similarly publicly committed to burning 
less”. In a situation in which some countries refuse to constrain themselves and 
continue freely to bum cheap fossil fuel, still the rest of us would be better off with 
less than universal restraint than with imiversal licence. Therefore it appears to be 
umeasonable in the strategic sense to commit ourselves to the generalised conditional 
principle: cooperate if but only if  all others will. However, if we allow some to 
freeload, then on premises of strategic rationality it becomes rational to join the free 
riders. Alternatively, we could try to make free-riding more costly, by sanctioning 
those who burn more. But sanctioning others is itself costly. In the case of global 
warming we cannot induce others to cooperate by threatening to withhold our own 
co-operation. The tlii'eat (to continue to burn more for the sake of a fairer distribution 
of ecological restraint) is simply not credible; it risks values too important to all of us. 
We must look to other ways to sanction the non-compliant. But these sanctions are 
also costly. Sanctioners make themselves worse off for the sake of a global benefit. In 
this situation, morality requires sanctions; but it is difficult to show that sanctioning 
is rational in the strategic sense. Thus, the need for sanctions marks a limit on 
instrumentally rational morality.
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Now these negative examples suffice to show that nonnative principles, insofar as 
they are rationally grounded on the premises of self-interest and instrumental 
rationality are not at all principles of morality. They are instead strategic principles 
that could lead to ends that are immoral or even prudentially harmfi.il.
To illustrate this, take for example the case of fixing contested quotas for catching fish 
among the interested nations. Following the strategic model, in order to find out which 
norms are rationally justified in fixing the quotas, it is necessary only to consider the 
contested norms as means of reaching the next higher purpose that is common to the 
conflicting parties. For by this consideration it may be shown that the norms are 
indeed means of instruments to be used to serve the interests of the conflicting parties.
The crucial point of this model is the procedure of agreement about common purpose. 
And precisely this aspect of the model is ambivalent with regar'd to the presupposed 
type of rationality. On this model account, it would be rational to reach an agreement 
as quickly as possible by focusing on the interests of the conflicting parties and by 
leaving aside all ideological implications. Now if this principle is followed, then the 
whole model is one of a strategical rationality o f  negotiating that has nothing to do 
with morality. For in this case the model may also be applied by the members of two 
gangs who have problems with organising the drug trade, for instance. If the 
procedure of agreement had to be a moral one, then it would have to consider and 
observe from the beginning some principle that would at least forbid a quick 
agreement involving only the conflicting parties at the cost of all other affected
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people. Moreover, even if  all affected people were actually to agree on some purpose 
this purpose might not be identical with the “good life”, for it could be that 
incidentally all affected people are actually interested in something harmfiil, say 
drugs. Mutually advantageous agreements on nomis that co-ordinate individual 
strategic actions are not a guarantee of a responsible collective choice. Some 
collectives, for instance, might be co-ordinated in destroying the ecosystem. This 
points out the degree to which we can account for the co-operative dimension in 
collective actions without appeal to any moral sense of rationality and to motivations 
which are not exclusively self-interested. At the same time, it reveals the shortcoming 
of morality based on strategic rationality.
The mechanism of co-ordination of human actions by contracts whose fulfilment is 
enforced by sanctions is therefore not enough to warrant and account for the 
possibility of that type of universal responsibility- or better co-responsibility- that is 
demanded by the environmental predicament. For, to account for people's 
responsibility or co-responsibility within the frame of institutions, or even for the 
responsibility of institutions or corporations within the frame of a state of law, is not 
enough. Beyond that it is necessary to ground or prove the possibility and 
reasonableness of a moral co-responsibility of all human beings, according to their 
competence and power, even for the institutions themselves, including the institution 
of the state of law.
49
Chapter 2 Grounding Environmental Responsibility
One has to consider in this context that from the point of view of philosophical 
enlightenment, all institutions, even those of the state of law and its monopoly on 
enforcing a certain co-ordination of co-responsible actions, have to be considered in 
their turn as the result of responsible contracts which themselves have to be 
legitimised by ethical reasons. Without this foundation the social contracts could not 
be morally binding for those who enter upon them. And, to emphasise again, the 
attempt at grounding by the strategic self-interest of the contractors is doomed to 
failure- in spite of Hobbes and his many followers- for the common self-interest of 
the contractors cannot exclude the possibility of an overruling self-interest of single 
persons, i.e. their concluding the contract with a criminal proviso which makes it 
possible to exploit the state of law by taking the parasitic role of a free rider. Hence, 
all the dilemmas and social traps analysed in rational decision theory would recur if it 
were not possible to ground a pre-institutional and pre-contractual notion of moral co­
responsibility.
This indicates that the problem of groimding moral norms rationally is by no means 
philosophically trivial and it cannot be reduced to an instrumental-teclinical or 
strategical problem. This may also be shown with regard to modern game theory if it 
is used as a foundation of ethics together with contract theory as is the case, for 
example, in Jolin Rawls’s Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971).
50
Chapter 2 Grounding Environmental Responsibility
The theory of strategical games, to be sure, may show that co-operative games or 
rather co-operative phases of games are possible and even probable on the 
presupposition of purely strategical interaction. Robert Axelrod (Axelrod, 1984), for 
instance, has shown that it certainly is true that in a one-off Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
individuals would defect from collective schemes that would leave them all better off, 
in pursuit of a yet-higher payoff for themselves. But in an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game involving the same people time and again, the rational way of playing 
is to cooperate only with people who have co-operated in the past (and presumably 
will continue to do so in the future). Among repeat players of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, and collective action games more generally, tit-for~tat can therefore be 
shown to be a singularly robust strategic choice. The conclusion is that co-operative 
play, in the form of adherence to the mutually advantageous scheme rather than 
destructive defection, is the rational option.
Nevertheless, the tacit conventions of the rational choices (such as “tit-for-tat” 
strategy) must be replaced by the idea of an explicit social contract, if 
intersubjectively valid norms are to be grounded rationally. For it is only on this level 
of a contract that the rational decisions or choices of the individuals who are 
presupposed by the gaiue theory may be made explicit. Thus, the problem of justice 
as fairness is posed by Rawls tlirough a combination of the presuppositions of 
strategical game theory and contract theory. But precisely on these preconditions the 
problem aiises whether a rational choice in the sense of the theory of strategical
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games, that is on the presuppositions of self-interest and value-neutral rationality, 
may be thought of as a sufficient foundation of ethics.
Rawls tries to solve this problem in the following way. In order to show that rational 
agents could or would choose a state of justice on the presuppositions of self-interest 
and strategical rationality, Rawls supposes an artificial situation where the "moral 
point of view” would be identical with the point of view of everybody’s self-interest. 
This is reached chiefly by the supposition of the so-called “veil o f ignorance” with 
regard to one’s own position in the society to be established by the social contract. 
For in such a situation, according to Rawls, everybody would calculate his or her 
risks and, hence, would choose from his or her self-interest a social order that is 
oriented toward a compensation of individual disadvantages rather than toward 
reconfirming the natural and social inequality of starting chance. In short, everybody 
would choose a social order of justice. Thus, Rawls tries to make congruent, so to 
speak, Hobbes’s foundation of the social contract with that of Kant (Rawls, 1971).
However, Rawls did not succeed in doing so. More precisely, he has not shown that in 
the “original situation” everybody must choose (from his or her self-interest) a social 
order of justice and give up, in principle, the “tacit criminal reservation” with regard 
to the chosen order. This at least cannot be achieved, in principle by the fiction of 
external boundary-conditions of the situation of choice. It could only be conceived by 
the supposition of an internal determination or motivation of the will toward negating 
or at least restricting the principle of calculated self-interest by another rational
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principle. But in this case rationality would not be a value-neutral faculty of 
calculation in the service of self-interest but rather a faculty of a trans-subjective 
motivation and valuation. Is such rationality conceivable? Or, to put it differently, if 
the means-ends-rationality applied to human interaction cannot provide a basis for 
moral co-responsibility of action, (since it necessarily leads to dilemmas and social 
traps), would it be possible to take recour se to a conception of rationality with regard 
to the co-ordination of human actions that is different from strategic rationality of 
human action?
In what follows it is argued that this question can be answered positively by the 
conception of co-responsibility that stems from discourse ethics. This concept of co­
responsibility has its rational foundation in the philosophical paradigm of 
communicative rationality which is proposed-or rather disclosed- by discourse ethics.
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Discourse-Ethical Conception of Responsibiiity
Conventional Concept of Responsibility
Etymologically the term "responsibility" stems from the Latin word respondere ("to 
respond"). This word had a particular significance in Roman law. Defendants, 
"responded" to an accusation against them by giving reasons and arguments intended 
to justify their own conduct. If the court had found these reasons and argmnents 
unacceptable, the defendants would have been required "to respond" to the accusation 
in a different and non-verbal way, i.e. by imprisonment, by the payment of a fine, or 
by capital punishment (Bodenheimer, 1980). The term responsibility is sometimes 
used with reference to impersonal causes of something, i.e. "the short circuit was 
responsible for the fire". This causal responsibility indicates an appropriate causal 
relation and by itself is morally irrelevant. Instead, traditional ethical theories have 
focused on issues concerning personal responsibility. The questions of what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being morally accountable for one's actions 
have dominated the ethical examination of the concept of personal responsibility. It 
seems to be widely agreed that "a person is regarded as morally responsible for some 
act or occun'ence X if and only if he is believed (1) to have done X or to have brought
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X about; and (2) to have done it or brought it about freely" (Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, 1967)/ In addition to the ability for free action, traditional moral 
tliinldng usually includes in the conceptual structme of personal moral responsibility 
the capability of rational conduct, i.e. capacity for practical deliberation and 
anticipation of possible outcomes of actions. In order to be held responsible, 
according to the traditional notion of responsibility, a person has to be able to 
anticipate predictable outcomes of the actions and to evaluate the reasons for the 
actions.
However, this notion of responsibility appears to be inadequate in the new realities of 
the world that has to cope with global, far-reaching and future-related environmental 
impacts of human collective activities. It presuposses that harms and their causes are 
individual, that they can readily be identified, and that they are local in space and 
time. It also presuposses that the individual must accept alone the responsibility for 
the action in which she participates.
Yet, as has already been indicated, there are some important dimensions of 
environmental problems that cannot be captured adequately by the conventional 
notion of responsibility. For instance, in the environmental area causes and harms 
may be diffuse and remote in space and time; apparently harmless and undercritical 
contributions of many single actors can have cumulative or synergistic effects and
Although the assumption that a person must have acted freely in order to be held morally responsible 
fo r  the action is a common one, there is a considerable disagreement about the issue o f  "free action". 
This controversy contains a vast range o f  philosophical questions regarding the concepts offi'eedom  
and determinism that cannot be discussed in this work.
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produce devastating consequences etc. According to Dale Jamieson, (Jamieson, 1993) 
it is for this reason that we are often left feeling confused about how to tliink about 
these problems. He gives a good example of difficulties posed to the conventional 
conception of responsibility by environmental problems such as global wanning.
“Some projections suggest that one effect of global warming may be 
to shift the southern hemisphere cyclone belt to the south. If this 
occurs the frequency of cyclones in Sydney, Australia will increase 
enormously, resulting in death and destruction on a large scale. The causes 
of this death and destruction will be diffuse. There is no one whom we can 
identify as the cause of destmction. (....) Instead of there being a single 
cause of harm, millions of people will have made tiny, almost 
imperceptible causal contributions- by driving cars, cutting trees, using 
electricity etc. They will have made their contributions in the coui'se of their 
daily lives performing apparently “imiocent acts”, without intending to 
bring about this harm. Moreover, most of these people will be 
geographically remote from Sydney. Many of them will have no idea 
where Sydney, Australia is. Furthermore, some people who are harmed 
will be remote in time from those who have harmed them. Sydney 
may suffer in the twenty-first century in part because of people’s 
behaviour in the 19*'^  and 20^ '^ centuries. Many small people doing small 
things over a long period of time together will cause unimaginable harms. 
Yet despite the fact that serious, clearly identifiable harms will have 
occurred due to human agency, conventional morality would have trouble
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finding anyone to blame. For no one intended the bad outcome, not brought it
about, nor even was able to foresee it.”
So, today we face the possibility that the global environment may be destroyed, yet 
no one will be responsible. The conventional conception of responsibility seems to 
collapse when we try to apply it to global environmental problems such as those 
associated with human-induced global climate change. Unless we develop a new 
conception of responsibility we will have difficulties in overcoming the feeling of 
confiision we face any time when we try to apply the conventional notion of 
responsibility to environmental problems.
However, the requirements of taking over responsibility for the future, remote or 
global environmental effects of collective activities may indeed appear* almost 
preposterous from the individual point of view. Individual actors may feel completely 
overbindened and powerless in the face of novel tasks of environmental 
responsibility. Thus, one may ask: is a new conception o f responsibility actually 
conceivable?
Immediatelly, a negative anwer to our question may be found in sociological system 
theory. Sociological systems theorists, particularly Niclas Luhmann, claim that 
individual actors have no chance of controlling or being responsible for the outcome 
of collective activities. The latter have rather to be considered as being coerced by the 
so called “constraints of systems rationality”. On Luhmann’s view, system analysis of
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the all-important structures of modem society shows that it does not make sense any 
longer to impute concepts of collective responsibility and collective rationality, and to 
derive from these concepts meaningfiil judgements about pathological trends of 
modern society. According to Lulimami, from the basic insight into the problem­
solving capacities, or steering potentials of modern society, it follows that- should 
there be solutions to the ecological problems of modern society at all - they cannot be 
found in “new ideas about values, a new morality or an academic elaboration of an 
environmental ethics” (Luhmann, 1989).
The question can be raised, however, as to how adequate the model of social systems 
theory is in providing a description of modern society and its way of reacting to the 
enviromnental problems. Breuer (1986), for example, noticed that some social system 
theorists assimilate society to a huge administrative and bureaucratic agency with 
differentiated and more or less unconnected responsibilities and departments, whose 
modus operandi shows striking analogies to Kafka’s Castle. Beck (1994) has 
compounded this critique: he admits that, for instance, Luhmann succeeds in 
describing the “organised irresponsibility” of modern society but he criticises 
Lulmiann for adhering to some kind of cynical metaphysics by converting these facts 
into iiTevocable necessities. Somewhat more moderately, Habermas (Habermas, 
1987) relates Luhmann’s systems-theoretical description to the pathological fringes 
of modern society.
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Yet, leaving aside the controversial diagnosis of system theory, it could be pointed 
out once again that each person can be held responsible only for actions she can be 
held accountable for, that is, actions or activities of whose performance she can be in 
charge, say, by virtue of her status or institutional role. Contra the demands of 
environmental responsibility, one could argue that it is impossible for the individual 
to assume responsibility for the unforeseeable consequences of the political, 
technical, and economic activities of modern industrial society, and that all this talk 
about our moral responsibility for the environmental impacts of collective activities 
amounts to a kind of "hyper-ethics". Arnold Gehlen, for instance, in his “Morals and 
Hypermorals” (Gehlen, 1973) argues that the word "responsibility" has a clear 
meaning only in cases where someone receives a public accounting of the 
consequences of his or her actions and knows it, for instance, the politicians in their 
electoral success, the manufacturers in the marketplace, the civil servants in the 
criticism that they receive from their superiors, the workers in the checks made on 
their perfoimance, etc.
The objection that it makes no sense to talk about personal responsibility with regard 
to the unforeseeable consequences of collective actions is indeed convincing if one 
tacitly presupposes the conventional conception of responsibility. However, it 
appears that the novel demand for taking over responsibility for the M ure and more 
remote consequences of the agent's activity (possible combined with the effect of the 
other people's actions or omissions) might amount to an indirect moral co­
responsibility. Together with even more complex questions of indirect co-
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responsibility related to the problems of synergistic and cumulative threshold effects 
within interacting systems, this demand constructs a novel problem that cannot be 
dealt with satisfactorily within the conventional moral framework which only 
addresses the responsibility of single actors seen as private persons or of individuals 
in their professional roles within existing institutions. Rather, it presents itself as a 
demand of post-conventional morality. The idea of post-conventional morality is 
examined in the next section.
II
Post-Conventional Morality
The distinction between conventional and post-conventional morality follows from 
Piaget-Kohlberg tradition in developmental cognitive psychology. Kohlberg's work 
(Kohlberg, 1971; 1976; 1984) on development of moral judgement is of particular 
importance because it helps to understand the underlying concepts and reasoning 
involved in moral judgement and how they change in the individual over time. It 
could be also seen as a potential source of coiToborating evidence for the discursive 
conception of ethics advocated in this work.
In our context, of central interest are Kohlberg's assertions that there are universal 
forms under the surface of substantively different moral judgements; and that these 
forms can be ordered as a set of stages in the development of the individual capacity 
for moral judgement. The most advanced stage requires judgements to conform to
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postconventional, procedural criteria similar to those elucidated in discourse ethics. 
Kohlberg's interpretation of moral development as a progression through stages 
characterised by different Avays of understanding moral rightness and wi’ongness is 
summarised in table 1.
The six-stage, three-level model is the result of Kohlberg's findings over two decades 
of research. According to Kohlberg, the capacity of the individual for moral 
judgements passes tlu'ough stages each of which entails a new, more adequate set of 
cognitive operations than the preceding one. Such stages or structures of thought are 
not simple responses to the stimulus, but are both adaptations and active 
constructions of the individual. And these stages, it is claimed, are both culturally 
universal and invariant, although progress through the stages varies across, as well as 
within societies.
From a psychological perspective, the child moves from one stage to the next and 
sees the higher stage as more adequate, because it puts her in greater equilibrium with 
her environment. The psychological criteria of adequacy can be explained as 
increased "integration" and "differentiation" of moral consciousness at each higher 
stage. "Differentiation" refers to the degree to which the structure of thought at a 
given stage allows one to separate out specifically moral judgements from other value 
judgements. For example, at stage 1 the child does not differentiate between doing x 
because of fear of pimishment and doing it because it is "fair" or "right". 
"Integration", on the other hand, refers to the degree to which the individual can 
integrate conflicting claims in such a way as to resolve conflicts. The structure of
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Table 1 : Kohlberg's Stages o f M oral Development
Level and Stage Wliat Is Right Reasons for Doing Right Social Perspective o f  Stage
Level I- Preconventional 
Stage 1 -Heteronomous 
morality
To avoid breaking rules backed 
by punishment, obedience o f its 
own sake, and avoiding physical 
damage to persons and property
Avoidance o f punishment, and 
the superior power o f authorities
Egocentric poin t o f  view. Does not consider the interests of 
others or recognise that they differ from the actor's; does not 
relate two points o f  view. Actions are considered physically 
rather than in tenns o f  psychological interests o f others. 
Confusion o f  authority's perspective witlr one's own.
Stage2-Individualism. 
Instrumental Purpose, and 
Exchange
Following rules only when it is to 
someone's immediate interests; 
acting to meet one's own interests 
and needs and letting others do 
the same. Right is also what's fair, 
what's an equal exchange, a deal, 
an agreement.
To serve one's own needs or 
interests in a world where you 
have to recognise that other 
people have their interests, too.
Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everybody 
has his own interests to pursue and these conflicts, so that 
right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense)
Level II- Conventional 
Stage 3- Mutual interpersonal 
Expectations, Relationships, 
and Interpersonal Conformity
Living up to what is expected by 
people close to you or what 
people generally expect o f people 
in your role as son, brother, 
friend, etc. "Being good" is 
important and m eans having good 
motives, showing concern about 
others. It also means keeping 
mutual relationships, such as 
tnist„loyalty, respect and 
gratitude.
H ie need to be a good person in 
your own eyes and those of 
others. Your caring for others. 
Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire 
to maintain rules and authority 
which support stereotypical good 
behaviour.
Perspective o f  the individual in relationships with other 
individuals. Aware o f  shared feelings, agreements, and 
expectations which take primacy over individual interests. 
Relates points o f  view through the concrete Golden Rule, 
putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet 
consider generalised system perspective.
Stage 4 - Social System and 
Conscience
Fulfilling the actual duties to 
which you have agreed. Laws are 
to be upheld except in extreme 
cases where they conflict with 
other fixed social duties. Right is 
also contributing to society, the 
group, or institution.
To keep the institution going as a 
whole, to avoid the breakdown in 
the system "if everyone did it", or 
the imperative o f  conscience to 
meet one's defined obligations.
Differentiates societal point o f  v iew fonn  interpersonal 
agreement ormotive.s. Takes the point o f view o f the system 
that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in 
terms of place in the system.
Level III- Post-conventional 
o r  P rincipled 
Stage 5- Social Contract or 
Utility and Individual Rights
Being aware that people hold a 
variety o f  values and opinions, 
that most values and rules are 
relative to your group. These 
relative rules should usually be 
upheld, however, in the interest o f 
impartiality and because they are 
the social contract. Some 
nonrelative values and rights like 
life and liberty, however, must be 
upheld in any society and 
regardless o f majority opinion.
A sense o f obligation to law 
because o f  one's social contract to 
make and abide by laws for the 
welfare o f  all and for the 
protection o f  all people's rights. A 
feeling o f contractual 
commitment, freely entered upon, 
to family, friendship, tnist, and 
work obligations. Concern that 
laws and duties be based on 
rational calculation o f overall 
utility, "the greatest good for the 
greatest number".
Prior .society perspective. Perspective o f a rational individual 
aware o f  values and rights prior to social attachments and 
contracts. Integrates perspectives by fonnal mechanisms o f 
agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. 
Considers moral and legal points o f view; recognises that 
they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate 
them.
Stage 6- Universal ethical 
principles
Following self-chosen ethical 
principles. Particular laws or 
social agreements are usually 
valid because they rest on such 
principles. When laws violate 
these principles, one acts in 
accordance with the principle. 
Principles are universal principles 
o f Justice: the equality o f human 
rights and respect for the dignity 
o f  human beings as individual 
persons.
Tire belief as a rational person in 
the validity o f  universal moral 
principles, and a sense o f personal 
commitment to them.
Perspective o f  m oral point o f  v/Viv from which social 
arrangements derive. Perspective is that o f any rational 
individual recognising the nature o f morality or the fact that 
persons arc ends in themselves and must be treated as such.
Source: Kohlberg (1976, 1984)
thinking at higher stages allows the individual a proportionately increased capacity to 
assume imaginatively the role of others involved in conflict. The more roles or points 
of view a structure of thought can accommodate, the more moral judgements derived
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from it will bring the individual into equilibrium. As Kohlberg (1971) says "a moral 
situation in disequilibrium is one in which there aie um'esolved conflicting claims".
It appears that Kohlberg's work supports the claims of philosophers in the formalistic 
tradition from Kant to Rawls and Habermas. Specifically, it could be argued that his 
psychological explanation of why a child moves from one stage to the next "maps 
into" a philosophical explanation as to why a higher stage is more adequate in the 
sense of a more rational moral scheme. Differentiation can thus be seen as a process 
of developing the moral autonomy of the agent, and integration becomes an 
interpretation of the idea that moral judgements must be universalizable in the sense 
of taking account of the claims of all others.
Thus Kohlberg's "developmental logic" of moral consciousness seems to provide a 
more general theoretical perspective on the possible and necessary transgression of 
the conventional morality.
The definition of responsibility as related to professional roles and to institutional 
realities, quoted from Gehlen, corresponds exactly with that stage of moral 
consciousness which Kohlberg has characterised as stage 4 (law and order) of 
conventional morals. Here, the duties of reciprocity are understood as duties related 
to professional roles determined by the division of labour within the society. As thus 
related, these duties are internalised and intensified. It is thus a question of a morality
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in accordance with which everyone, but especially the professional or the civil 
servant, does her duty within the framework o f the rules and regulations. The final 
stage of conventional morality, together with the conditions for their societal 
application, obviously represent an advance in cultuial evolution. But, according to 
Kohlberg it is by no means the most advanced stage of moral development. In the 
context of “developmental logic” of the moral consciousness in general it is possible 
to distinguish two philosophically distinct stages of a post-conventional moral 
consciousness.
First, there is stage 5, involving a legalistic, contractual orientation with utilitarian 
overtones. The post-conventional character of this stage is represented by the 
individuals who no longer see in the conventional norms and laws of their society the 
imquestionable and ultimate standard for their moral orientation. Rather, they are in 
principle ready, willing and able for the purpose of legitimising the laws and 
conventions of the society to question their usefulness.
In this orientation of stage 5 it becomes evident, however, that this stage does not yet 
bring to consciousness in indisputable form the final basis upon which morality could 
be founded rationally. Let us demonstrate this by an example. If someone were to 
ask: “Why should I keep an agreement into which I have entered”, the appropriate 
anwer would not be, “Because it is useful for you to do so”. For it is quite possible 
that it is not at all usefiil for the individual to keep an agreement that is no longer in 
her interest. Indeed, a strategically rational utility maximiser may conclude contracts
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from the beginning with the strategic reservation that she will break them at her 
convenience in order to enjoy the benefits of free-ride. Hence, the morally relevant 
answer to the question “Why should I keep the agreement?” must at the very least be, 
“Because it is useful for everyone that you do so”. And, strictly speaking, by 
“everyone” must be meant not only those taking part in concluding the agreement, by 
also those affected by the agreement. At this point it should become evident that the 
criterion consisting in the factual conclusion of an agreement is not an ultimate moral 
criterion at all, and that the additional criterion of usefulness is at the very least 
ambiguous, namely, in the sense of the question “Useful for whom?”
Kohlberg distinguishes from the post-conventional stage 5 a further stage in his 
developmental logic of the moral consciousness. Stage 6, the last and highest stage, is 
that of the autonomous conscience that orients itself in relation to the universal 
principle o f strictly universalised reciprocity. The main idea that Kohlberg has in 
mind in this context become clear when one understands, in his and Piaget’s sense, 
the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of the moral consciousness as a possible 
universalisation and reflexive internalisation of the reciprocity of role-taking. As an 
example, Kant’s “categorical imperative”, acceding to Kohlberg would have to be 
understood as a principle of stage 6: the suitability of a maxim of action to become a 
universal law must be measured by the question whether the content of the law that 
one has in mind can still be affirmed when one has placed oneself in the situation of all 
those affected by the law and has, from their standpoint, judged the pertinent state of 
affairs. At this point it becomes clear that this conception of morality, thought through 
to its conclusions by means of a developmental logic, is a very similar to discourse
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ethics. In the discourse ethical framework, Kant’s categorical imperative is likewise 
re-interpreted in such a way that the content of whichever universal law one happens 
to have in mind must be tested against the critical judgements of others who are 
affected by it.
At this jimcture, however, we should raise the following question: How does the 
conception o f the post-conventional morality relate to the question o f  environmental 
responsibility? Now at this point it should be clearer that the novel demand for taking 
over responsibility for the environmental effect of our collective activities presents 
itself as a demand of a post-conventional morality. At issue here is a univet'salistic 
ethics in which the "internal morality" in many respects still talcen for granted would 
have to be transcended.
Yet, here we have reached the characteristic problem situation of moral philosophy in 
our day. On the one hand, environmental issues confront us with future-related and 
global problems of humankind as a whole, and beyond that, problems of responsible 
co-operation of the different agents (individual as well as collective and corporate, 
including nations), in order to cope with the common problems. All of these problems 
obviously call for a common, universally valid foundation of co-responsibility We 
have seen that the approach based on strategic rationality is limited and camiot 
provide a basis for solidarity and coresponsibility since it always leads to dilemmas 
and social traps. On the other hand, it seems that the most of the contemporary moral 
theories deny the possibility of a rational foundation of universally valid ethics. Their
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common assumption is that there are no context-transcendent universal criteria for 
morality, or that moral principles are respectively anchored in our cultural tradition 
(Rorty, 1991; MacIntyre, 1981;1988). Additionally, the older forms of post- 
conventional, universalistic ethics, e.g. that of Kant, fail to fulfil what has today 
become the indispensable function of a responsibility to the future because they are 
still based on the unquestioned presupposition of a constant conditio hinnana. Though 
these ethics do postulate a principle of universalization valid for all human actions 
that can be brought into relation with one another in a given present, they do not, 
however, take into account the irreversible relation that human actions have to the 
future. In particular, they do not consider the future relation for which we, with all 
our technologically multiplied power of intervening into ecosystems, are primarily 
responsible and which alters the conditio hiimana itself, namely, the impact of our 
collective teclinological actions on future generations.
Kant’s categorical imperative, for instance, is established, as it were, abstractly 
without a concrete relation to time, in a hypothetically assumed realm of 
contemporaneously existing rational beings. The maxim of action that can be made 
into a universal law is thus put to the test solely in a mental experiment that can be 
carried out at any time whatsoever. It is, however, as Hans Jonas put it, “no part of 
this rational reflection that there should exist any probability whatsoever of my 
private choice actually becoming a universal law or of its even contributing to such a 
process of becoming universal. As a matter of fact real consequences are not
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contemplated at all, and the principle is not that of objective responsibility, but that of 
the subjective state of my own self- determination” (Jonas, 1984)
Thus, for instance, it would be logically quite compatible with the abstract rational 
agreement that Kant demands, for one to accept as a consequence of all the actions of 
the present generation the proposition that in the M ure humanity will no longer be 
able to exist. That the succession of generations in time “should continue” cannot be 
deduced from the rule of reason’s agreement with itself inside the succession of 
generations however long or short a time this succession happens to endure.
How, then, is a binding normative foundation for a universal co-responsibility 
possible?
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Foundations for Universal Co-responsibility
A conception of universal responsibility or rather co-responsibility can be grounded 
by strict reflection on the actual situation of practising communicative rationality, for 
instance, by those who argue about ethics. Since by engaging in argumentative 
process we ar e presupposing, in principle, an argumentation community of fellow- 
arguers, we can also ascertain that we are not only responsible to all other reasoning 
beings but also, from the beginning share this responsibility with all of them. This 
consideration provides the rational foimdation for that post-conventional concept of 
co-responsibility which we need in our time in order to respond to the challenge of 
the ecological crisis. This claim requires further explanation.
The critical point of the discourse-ethical transformation of classical ethics lies in 
overcoming the absolutization of the subject-object relation as the paradigm of 
modern philosophy since Descailes. Discourse ethics introduces the subject-co- 
subject relation of communicative understanding as the necessarily complementary 
dimension with respect to the perception of something within the subject-object- 
relation. Therefore, the "original situation" of discourse ethics is the situation o f
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arguing (Apel, 1993). This shift from an "I am thinking" to an "I am ai'guing" starting 
point necessarily includes certain features that transcend the methodological 
solipsism of classical philosophy. Precisely these additional features may provide, at 
the same time, the foundation for epistemology and for ethics.
Apel (1987) claims that the transcendental-reflexive founding of discourse ethics 
shows that the fundamental presuppositions of methodical solipsism- that everyone 
thinlcs for himself and that everyone bears alone the responsibility for the actions in 
which he is involved- are ftindamentally false. He has demonstrated (Apel, 1980, 
1987) that even value-neutral objectifying Imowledge in the sense of modern science 
is not possible without the complementary "transcendental-pragmatic presupposition" 
of a non-value-neutral-relationship of communicative understanding in a wide sense.
In fact, even the most solitary reflection, e.g. the Cartesian mental experiment of 
"methodical doubt" (Descartes, 1954), as a mode of thinking that makes a claim to 
intersubjective validity, must presuppose language and, with it, a community o f  
communication. This, according to Apel (1987), limits any attempt by modern natural 
science to place the world at a distance as a value-free area of pure facts. Since it 
undertakes the search for truth in the dimension of intersubjectivity, value-free 
natural science itself must also presuppose an ethics. Yet, by observing this, what is 
attained for the foundation of an ethics of co-responsibility?
In the ftamework of discourse ethics, the level of argumentative discourse is the 
ultimate instance of rationality. By strict reflection on the implicit meaning of the
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argumentative acts it could be shown that, in order to argue reasonably, one must accept 
a "noiTnative principle of trans-subjectivity" (Apel, 1989). Thus, participants in 
argumentative discourses must have admitted a priori that it is possible, in principle, to 
share the intersubjective validity of meaning and truth witli communication partners, or 
rather, strictly speaking, with all possible competent members of an indefinite 
community of commimication. This principle of "trans-subjectivity" implies also a 
fundamental ethical norm, namely, "the principle of generalised reciprocity of right and 
duties" (Apel, 1989). This principle is nothing'but a reflective explication of those 
normative contents that must have always been inlierent in human communication by 
speech. For in the situation of argumentative discourse in which a conflict should be 
resolved solely by the force of better argument, participants must suppose "an ideal 
speech situation" (Habermas, 1990), and thereby assign equal rights and duties of 
asking and answering all kinds of questions concerning any feasible issue to all possible 
members of the argumentation-community.
So, the assumption of discourse ethics is that, by participating in an argumentative 
discourse within a real communication community, individuals have already anticipated 
the existence of an ideal community. Participants in argumentation are, so to speak, 
members of a real community of communication, and simultaneously members of an 
“ideal communication community” (Apel, 1993). The latter community, of course, does 
not really exist but it is presupposed for the inspection and recognition of validity of 
claims to tmth and rightness. It is merely a counterfactual anticipation or a regulative 
principle. The reason why this ideal communication community has to be presupposed 
lies in the fact that, by using arguments with claims for universal validity, one must
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transcend every particular community, and anticipate the judgement of an indefinite 
ideal audience, which alone could be definitely understand and evaluate the universal 
validity claims.
This dialectical double structure of the community presupposition, which through strict 
and thorough reflection is found to be an undeniable pre-structure of any argumentative 
act, provides foundations for a universal ethics that crosses both space and time 
boundaries. With the necessary anticipation of an unlimited, ideal community of 
communication, participants in ai’gumentation have to recognise that, in principle, all 
valid solutions to problems - including especially the morally relevant solutions- would 
have to be capable of being accepted by all members of the unlimited, ideal community 
of communication, if they were able to take part in the discussion. This implies that 
they should consider not only interests of the members of the real community of 
communication (persons who belong to the present generation, and who are capable of 
participating in discourses) but also the interests of members of the unlimited 
community of communication (persons who will exist someday, or who exist but are 
not capable of communication). Although the latter cannot take place in discourses 
aimed to establish just and fair social arrangements, consideration of their interests 
appears to be justified in a twofold respect. In the first place, because of the coherence 
of all valid solutions to the problems, participants in the real argumentation (who, 
needless to say, belong to the present generation), in the course of building a consensus, 
have to consider the interests of all potential members of the unlimited commimity of 
argumentation (that includes those with “restricted communicative competence” as well
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as M ure generations). Secondly, because of the recognition of the fiindamental equality 
of rights shared by all potential partners in discourse, they must now talce responsibly 
into account the prospective problems and concerns of the members who will 
presumably exist someday.
II
At this juncture one may ask: How should we conceive the transfer o f  the original co­
responsibility revealed by reflexive founding o f discourse ethics toward the answers 
to the novel task o f  environmental responsibility? And at once it should be said that at 
the end of this line of transfer will always be personally accountable duties. But this 
is not the characteristic part of the transfer that is suggested and regulated by 
discourse ethics. The characteristically novel task of discursively organising and 
practising enviromnental responsibility has rather to be fulfilled in om* day by a 
world-wide network of formal or informal dialogues and other forms of discursive 
environmental decision-making at all levels.
Yet, environmental decision-making is an extremely complex process. It is 
characterised, on the one hand, by a number of conflicting interests to be carefully 
considered as claims or quasi-claims- for instance those of all living beings and their 
relation to that of humankind, or those of the different human societies, or, in another 
respect, of different social systems, as e.g. politics, economy, law, science, 
technology, etc. On the other hand, there is a problem of the relevant infonnation
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about facts and possible or probable effects and side-effects of collective actions or 
long-teiin activities. Let us turn to the latter problem first.
Whereas Immanuel Kant could still say that "neither science nor philosophy is needed 
in order to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise 
and virtuous" (Kant, 1949), this can no longer be said for today's responsible 
decision-making, particularly in the domain of environmental policy. Today, 
decision-makers constantly need the consultation of other experts concerning the 
relevant facts, circumstances and consequences of their decision. But, in order to 
provide the relevant facts for environmental policy, science has to cope with 
enormous difficulties. These difficulties stem from the specific features of 
environmental issues that distinguish them from the conventional scientific problems.
Firstly, environmental problems are complex phenomena. Their complexity stems 
from the complexity of the eco-systems we are interacting with, and the complexity 
of the socio-economic systems which do the interacting. The extremely complex web 
of mutual depending elements and interactions makes the anticipation and possible 
governing of the effects of our activities very difficult. Uncertainty with regard to the 
consequences of our action and the future conditions of the natural environment is 
also an important feature of environmental problems. Further, some of the 
environmental problems are global and long-term in their impact. Thus, facing
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environmental problems, science enters the realm where "facts are uncertain, values 
in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent" (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992).
This opens the intricate question related to how to get reliable expertise in the domain 
of enviromnental policy. Important consequences of this situation are that, on the one 
hand, even so-called value-free or ethically-neutral science has indirectly, due to its 
possible practical effects, become a matter of the highest ethical responsibility, and 
that, on the other hand, relevant decisions cannot be made solely on the basis of 
scientific explanations nor can they result automatically from the facts ascertained by 
science.
This new context seems to call for a reformulation of the laiowledge relevant for 
making informed decisions. Since science may not be able to deliver all relevant facts 
regarding environmental issues, then scientific method and rigor should be adapted to 
the new context. Taking this new context seriously means that, while we should bring 
together and take into account all available scientific knowledge, we should also 
consider non-scientific reflection and understanding. If we want to settle questions 
concerning the wider implications of enviromnental issues through a rationally 
motivated agreement, then we need to widen environmental discourse on all levels of 
decision-making. Complexity, non-reducibility, uncertainty, and other characteristics 
of environmental problems cannot be adequately addressed in disciplinary isolation 
but rather require discourse in what Funtowicz and Ravetz call “extended peer 
communities” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992). Discourse ethics, by providing a conceptual and
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methodological framework for an open discourse, can malce an important 
contribution here.
Secondly, in order to establish universally acceptable nouns with regard to the 
environment we must also talce conditions of possible co-existence of different 
cultures and value systems into consideration. Hence we are confronted with the 
problem of rendering different value-systems compatible. This can only be achieved 
by imposing constraints, i.e. restrictive conditions, upon the normatively relevant 
dimensions of the different value-systems of the different cultures. Now in our day, in 
the context of environmental affairs, this means not only securing equal rights, but, 
moreover, securing the equal co-responsibility of all of the different societies on the 
level of global co-operation with regard to all of the common concerns of humankind. 
Precisely this is the new dimension of a imiversal co-responsibility which is required 
in our day by the challenge of the ecological crisis.
All of the typical environmental problems such as the protection of rainforests, global 
warming, the problem of overpopulation and that of a saving and simultaneously 
distributionally just exploitation of the resouices of the earth, etc., make it necessary 
for the peculiar interests and value-systems of the different societies to be subjected 
to constraints in favour of the common interest of humanldnd. This holds in 
particular with regard to the value system of developed countries which revolves 
around the values of economic growth and increase in the “standard of life”. But it
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also holds for the way of life and the value systems of the developing countries, 
particularly with regard to the problem of population increase and the depletion of 
resoui'ces. Thus, in order to decide about universally acceptable norms which today 
should frinction as constraints to be imposed on the peculiar value-systems of the 
different societies, we need a fair mediation by aiguments both between the different 
interests of the different human individuals and individual cultures, and between this 
and the common interests of humanlcind. The mediation between the different value- 
systems of the different cultures, on the one hand and the universally binding moral 
norms and co-responsibility, on the other hand, requires institutional foims of 
decision-making that support a process of uncoerced and undistorted communicative 
interaction between different individuals and cultines. What is needed once more is 
an open discourse that encourages the mutual respect of alternative views and 
produces shared understanding of the environmental problems that face us all. Only 
on the basis of the mutual recognition and acceptance of others as responsible agents 
can we build a consensus on norms and envisage co-operative agreements about 
collective initiatives regarding the common enviromnent.
Thus, in order to devise new universally acceptable environmental norms, we have to 
take into account and luediate by means of argument all different rationales and 
different conflicting claims or quasi-claims tluough an equitable balance among 
interests. This discursive mediation of conflicting interests and rival perspectives 
represents both a legitimising process and a process whereby the nomis for protecting 
and enhancing the enviromnent can be delivered in an ethically acceptable way.
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III
There is a number of exemplary forms of discursive environmental decision-making 
at different levels suggestive of discourse ethics: public inquiries or hearings, 
environmental mediation, participatory models of planning, environmental and social 
impact assessment, environmental mediation, regulatory negotiation. Some of these 
“incipient discmsive designs” (Dryzek, 1992) have been successful at generating 
consensus among participants at least on part of their agenda. Despite the fact that 
many of them represent imperfect approximations to ideals of free discourse, and 
may be distorted in practice, they do suggest that legitimate environmental policy 
decisions now require informed participation by affected parties. The claim to 
legitimacy of the discursive decision-maldng models mentioned above is ultimately 
rooted in ideals of free discourse, i.e. in discourse ethics in which the only authorised 
power is that of the better argument.
The same holds true for discursive and deliberative approaches such as “Citizens 
Jury” and “Group Contingent Valuation” (Jacobs, 1997, Stern and Dietz, 1994) used 
most recently in the evaluation of public environmental goods. They are based on 
recognition that, where public goods are at issue, deliberative and discursive 
processes in which people are brought together to debate before making their 
judgements are the appropriate way of articulating public values. Such a discursive or 
deliberative approach may have the same piu-pose as more conventional survey
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methods, but it may be more reliable, however, because individuals at least have the 
opportunity to review their preferences in collaborative discussion with others.
This idea of deliberative value articulation is based on the normative political theory 
of deliberative democracy. As Michael Jacobs (1997) puts it,
”It is the view that democratic public decision-making should consist, not in 
the utilitarian aggregation of individual preferences, but in public debate on 
the public good. It presupposes- and demands- the existence of what 
Habemias called the “public sphere”; a civil space, between economy and 
state, in which uncoerced, reasoned political argument among citizens can 
occur. Such argument in turn requires and expresses a shared “communicative 
rationality”.”
It should be emphasised that the discursive and deliberative approach sees public 
deliberation not merely as a mechanism for collective decision making but as a basic 
feature of practical rationality. It highlights the importance of deliberative processes 
for environmental policy making, and suggests a convergence between discourse 
ethics and sophisticated empirical reseaich.
The discmsive and deliberative approach to decision-making has recently achieved 
greater recognition in the government sector. A large number of governments from 
both developed and developing countries formally endorsed a deliberative process
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for the enviromnent at the UNCED (commonly called the Rio conference) in 1992 
and, most recently in New York. Referred to as Agenda 21, this type of consensus 
building embraces the process whereby different organisations undertalce a 
deliberative process with the aim to reach a consensus on a sustainable environment 
for the future. On a community level, the Local Agenda 21 process is one in which 
individuals are brought together thiough discussion-oriented roundtables to define 
environmental issues and construct their concept of the local environment for the 
community. Again, the idea is based on finding what is common ground through an 
interactive process of discussion and sharing of information, laiowledge and 
experience.
The business community has also recognised that environmental issues call for an 
active dialogue among all affected by a certain issue. As the Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment (ACBE) recently pronounced in a consultative paper, 
corporations will need to move away from the “decide-announce-defend position” 
and instead adopt a decision-making process based on dialogue with “interested 
pai'ties” (ACBE, 1997). What is required, according to ACBE, is genuine two-way 
dialogue. This requires changes in both attitude and process. Companies must be 
prepared to discuss issues with interested parties, listening as much as explaining, and 
fully exploring the various potential approaches to tackling the problem. While 
ACBE believes that consensus building should be part of the business process for 
environmentally-sensitive decision-making, it recognises that the values of 
“interested parties” may conflict with each other and those of the company, and
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therefore it may not always be possible to achieve consensus. But the aim, ACBE 
believes, remains a valid one.
This emphasis on deliberative and discmsive processes of environmental decision­
making draws inspiration and support from many sources, but it is a contention of this 
PhD thesis that the rationale and main support for the “environmental deliberative 
democracy” (Jacobs 1997), can be found in discourse ethics.
The function of discourse ethics with regard to the deliberative decision-making 
processes could be seen in offering a noimative model in terms of an ideal procedure 
of deliberation and decision making that should be reflected in social institutions as 
much as possible. The procedure itself can be characterised in terms of the following 
postulates (developed here horn re-worked conditions o f the ideal speech situation; see page 19):
1. Practical discourse over an issue should be inclusive and public. No one 
may be excluded in principle- practical discourse ought to be open to all 
competent speakers whose interests are or will be affected by regulations 
adopted to resolve the issue.
2. The process of deliberation should take place in argumentative form, that 
is, tlnough the regulated exchange of infoimation and reasons among parties 
who introduce and critically test proposals.
3. Deliberations should be free of any external coercion. The participants are 
autonomous insofar as they are bound only by the presuppositions of
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communication and rules of argumentation. Existing power differentials 
between participants have to be neutralised in some way so that they have no 
bearing on issues within the co-operative pursuit of rational agreement 
through argumentation.
4. Deliberation should be free of any internal coercion that could detract from 
the equality of the participants. Each participant should have an equal 
opportunity to be heard, to introduce topics, to make contributions, to suggest 
and criticise proposals. Participants must be able to adopt a hypothetical 
stance toward their own interests, values, needs, etc., as well as to those 
expressed by others.
These postulates specify a procedure for reaching binding decisions that lie in the 
equal interest of all. Such a procedure should guarantee:
• the inclusion of all those affected;
• equally distributed and effective opportunities to participate in the political 
process;
• an equal right to influence decisions;
• an equal right to choose topics, and more generally, to control the agenda;
• q situation that allows all the participants to develop, in the light of sufficient 
information and good reasons, an articulate understanding of the contested 
interests and matter in need of regulation.
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To date, the criteria mentioned above have not been sufficiently satisfied by any 
established normative order or existing arrangement.
To be sui'e, unavoidable social complexity makes it necessary to apply the criteria in 
a differentiated fashion. Among other things, it requires the delegation of decision­
making powers and the sensitive modification of decision procedures- in general, the 
organisational reduction of complexity.
With regard to the ideal deliberation procedure and fundamental ethical norms, being 
recognised by discourse ethics as inherent in argumentative discourse, it should be 
said that they have the character of regulative ideas in the sense employed by Kant. 
Regulative ideas are normative principles which are binding on action in the sense 
that they define obligations and provide guidance for the long-term approximate 
realisation of an ideal. At the same time, however, they give expression to the insight 
that nothing which can be experienced in time can ever fully accord with the ideal. 
This means that at the same time as we recognise these principles, we know that we 
shall be able to realise them only in consideration of many pragmatic restrictions. 
Thus, the pragmatic restrictions upon the ideal principle of universalization (U) that 
considers no norm valid unless all those affected can accept “the consequences and 
side effects of its general observance” would require to incorporate the fact that many 
decisions are made under uncertainty and that the consequences of the norm 
observance can be, not just unknown, but even unknowable. Thus, if used as a 
criterion to evaluate discourses, the ideal principle of universalisation has to be
83
Chapter 4 Foimdations for Universal Co-responsibility
reformulated as: “no norm can be considered valid unless all those affected can 
accept the consequences associated, to the extent those consequences can be known f
These pragmatic restrictions need also to be imposed on another basic demand put 
forward by discourse ethics, namely that "only those norms may claim to be valid that 
could meet with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical 
discourse" (Habermas, 1990). In practice, of course, the postulates of discourse ethics 
can be realised in most cases only by means of the representation of interests tlirough 
some form of advocacy. In this sense too, the realisation is only more or less 
complete insofar as one must allow for the necessary limitations of time, the 
differences in human competence, the specialisation of discourses according to 
theme, etc. Yet, it should be said that in all these cases the pragmatic restrictions upon 
the ideal principle of discourse remain themselves subject to legitimation by the 
principle of discourse ethics.
To summarise, the discourse ethical approach does not attempt to determine universal 
principles for either individual conduct or social arrangements. It simply offers a 
procedural framework to resolving arguments or establishing norms. In the discourse 
ethical framework, argumentative discourse is seen as the normative "meta­
institution" with regard to all social institutions since it provides a perspective for 
settling competing normative claims fairly and impartially.
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The fundamental ethical norms which are presupposed by the argumentative 
discourse fonction, therefore, as "meta-norms" that prescribe the ideal procedure for 
grounding or legitimating material nomis. On this metainstitutional level as to all 
institutions, conventions, contracts etc., every member of the argumentation 
community has already implicitly accepted a kind of co-responsibility that a priori 
joins them together tluough an original solidarity with all other possible members of 
the argumentation community. This level comprises only those normative principles 
which can be grounded by reflection on what must be presupposed in argumentative 
discourse, e.g. equal rights and duties of co-responsibility of all possible arguers, and 
the aim of reaching a rational agreement about all controversial validity-claims by 
arguments alone. This foundation postulates that every validity-claim ought to be 
exposed to aigumentative discourse, in order to be affirmed, in principle, by a rational 
agreement.
Still, with regard to the level of real practical discourses, some a priori claims, that 
can be directly derived from the discoiuse-ethical foundation, have to be made. (Even 
these claims must, of course, be exposed to critical discussion). The claims concern 
the principle that all possible members of the, in principle indefinite, argumentation 
community have equal rights in representing their interests as claims by arguments, 
either by paiticipating themselves in the discourse or, at least, by being represented 
by advocates. It may also be postulated a priori that the regulative idea of practical 
discourses ought to be progressively realised by the establisliment of appropriate 
institutions of problem solving and settling of conflicts on all relevant levels- local.
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regional, national and international. For everyone who has accepted the principle of 
universal co-responsibility on the theoretical level of discourse ethics must also 
accept the commitment to the institutionalisation of practical discourses. This means 
that, on the practical level of discourse ethics, the commitment to the progressive 
realisation of discursive institutions for the solution of all problems of common 
concern becomes the value for everybody's realisation of the good life.
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The Discourse-Ethical Approach: An immanent Critique
In the discourse-ethical normative framework, rationally fomied consensus on what 
all could will as participants in practical discourse, i.e. the discursive unification of 
participants’ individual perspectives, becomes the basis of political legitimacy. The 
question could be raised, however, whether this rational consensus is a realistic ideal 
for institutional decision-maldng. In what follows this question will be examined. The 
aim is to show whether there is a tension between the discourse-ethical normative 
model that requires unification of particular perspectives and real decision-making 
processes. If this is the case, then the discourse-ethical approach should be modified 
in order to construct a more flexible and politically serviceable conception of rational 
agreement.
The discourse-ethical universalization principle (U)^, as a rule of argumentation, is 
meant to make consensus possible and ensure that only those norms are accepted as
 ^ The discourse-ethical principle o f  universalization is fomiulated as: “(U) For a norm to be valid, 
the consequences and side effects o f  its general observance for the satisfaction o f each person's 
particular interests must be acceptable to all." (Habermas, 1990)
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valid that express a general will. Its fonction is seen in establishing the link between 
different individual and group interests, and norms whose validity everyone accepts 
on the groimds that they are in the general or common interest. In other words, as a 
normative principle, it is meant to bridge the gap between the many “particular wills” 
and the “general will”.
The formation of a “general will”, on the other hand, is understood as a process of 
public deliberation that has the form of a debate in which competing particular 
interests are given equal consideration. It should be emphasised that “the general 
will”, “the common interest” and the like are regarded here not as the aggregation of 
individual interests but as the transcendence of merely particular interests in a search 
for the common good. Since discourse ethics regards this search as a public practice 
of shared, reciprocal perspective talcing, it requires of participants that they tiy to 
understand the situations and perspectives of others and give them equal weight to 
their own.
Yet, how does this work in a highly differentiated pluralistic society that involves not 
only different but also conflicting values and interests? Surely, the diversification of 
ways of life and increased individualism in modem society mean that differences in 
individual situation, social status, experience, etc., can also translate into differences 
concerning the relative cogency of different sorts of reasons for action. Does this 
mean that action oriented to mutual understanding ceases to be effective? Or, to put it
88
Chapter 5 An Immanent Critique
differently, how can we achieve a rational consensus in a situation when individuals 
have different value orientations and interest positions?
If we recall the universalization principle here the answer obviously will be: by 
argumentatively convincing everyone to accept the foreseeable consequences and 
side-effects that the general observance of a proposed norm can be expected to have 
for the satisfaction of each person’s interest. But, how can we achieve this in a 
situation when individuals have interests that are not only different but competing?
The first answer that comes to mind is that in this case a reasonable way of 
reconciling conflicting interests would be to negotiate a compromise. Yet, it is of 
decisive importance for discourse ethics that we do not answer in this way. This is not 
to say that discourse ethics rejects bargaining and compromise as reasonable means 
for dealing with conflicts of interests. Quite the contrary. But it subordinates them to 
the achievement of consensus in practical discourse. Compromise is an inferior 
alternative that we can turn to when discourse has shown there to be no common 
interest. Even if negotiated under conditions of a balance of power ensuring 
participants an equal opportunity to express their own interests, compromise does not 
represent the idea of impartially judging the interests of all concerned, and therefore 
fails to capture our sense of justice.
Only adoption of the moral point of view enables participants to transcend interest- 
oriented and value-based perspective and to discover general or common interests.
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This is why, according to discourse ethics, we can ai'guinentatively agree on what is 
in the general interest only if every participant adopts an impartial standpoint from 
which her own particular interest counts for no more nor less that those of any other 
participant.
Clearly, this is quite a demanding task for participants in political debate. However, it 
is not the only task posed to them. If we assume that not only the consequences 
among individuals and groups will differ but also their inteipretation and assessment 
of those consequences, we could see that there is another, even more demanding task 
posed to participants. The “ideal role taking” in which participants must engage will 
require each participant to put herself in the place of eveiy other participant in the 
very strong sense of coming to understand and appreciate the consequences from all 
of their inteipretative and evaluative perspectives. Under ideal conditions this would 
be backed by the requirement that each have the opportunity to present her own point 
of view and to seek to malce it comprehensible and plausible to others.
Nevertheless, even if we equip our good-willed participants with the intelligence and 
sensitivity to understand and appreciate the needs, interests and points of view of 
others, we are still far from rationally motivated consensus. For one thing, 
participants’ interpretations of their needs and interests cannot simply be taken at face 
value. The cultural interpretations in the light of which different participants 
understand their needs, values, and interests are also up for discussion. So consensus
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could be achieved only if all participants could come to agree on the authentic 
interpretation of their needs, and they would have to do so from the very different 
starting points afforded by a pluralistic and individualistic society. This would 
presumably entail criticising and rejecting value orientations that are too self- or 
group-centred to permit the proper weighting of the other participants’ needs. It is 
also likely that those value orientations imbued with racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, 
homophobia, or any other less than universalistic outlook would be rejected too. In 
short, only those value differences compatible with a post-conventional moral 
orientation can survive practical discourse.
But we still have a way to go before we can arrive at rationally motivated consensus. 
For we now have somehow to “synthesise” all of the various consequences, variously 
interpreted and variously assessed, into one unified moral judgement.
How, then, do we weigh needs and interests of one individual against needs and 
interests of the other? After hearing the arguments of everyone, each will have to 
judge for herself which nonuative regulation seems fairest to all of the different- and 
differently interpreted, assessed and weighted- interests involved. The success of the 
discourse-ethical universalization principle in generating “general will” depends on 
finding “universally accepted needs”. Yet, in a situation when there are fimdamental 
divergences in value orientations, the prospect that everyone would, even under ideal 
conditions, agree in a judgement of this sort looks blealc.
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The main reason for this should be sought in the fact that the separation of formal 
procedure from substantive content is never absolute: we cannot agree on what is just 
without achieving some measure of agreement on what is good. But the discourse- 
ethical model of public deliberations is conceived to deal precisely with situations in 
which there is an absence of such agreement, that is, when there is a need to regulate 
matters concerning which there are conflicting interests and values, competing 
conceptions of the good.
However, due to the tension between the reality of multiple value-perspectives and 
the ideal of rationally motivated consensus, the discourse-ethical approach would 
encounter some obstacles. As already noted, the increased individualism and 
pluralism of ways of life in modern societies, and the accompanying differences in 
background, situation, experience, training, and so forth regularly translate into basic 
differences in value orientation. And these differences get reflected in practical 
discourse aimed at the “universalistic justification of norms” and the ’’democratic 
generalisation of interests”. As a result, it appears that, under the conditions specified 
in the discourse-ethical model, unanimity on practical-political issues is not always 
attainable and that democratic institutions should not be constructed on the 
supposition that rational consensus is generally achievable.
Yet, discourse ethics insists on the supposition that possibility of rational consensus is 
not merely a normative or regulative ideal of argumentative discourse but one of its 
constitutive presuppositions. If participants in discourse did not make this
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supposition, if they were to assume instead that reaching agreement solely on the 
basis of reason is impossible, their linguistic behaviour would have a significance 
other than that of rational argumentation. More generally, if we were to drop the 
pragmatic presuppositions that we could convince others of the validity claims by 
offering good reasons in support of them, most of oin rational practices would lose 
their sense. In short, it would mean the elimination of our main alternative to 
violence, coercion, and manipulation as a means of conflict resolution and social co­
ordination.
However, let us assume for the sake of argument that we are dealing with a political 
dispute that reveals something like the iueducible plurality of evaluative standpoints. 
How can we reconcile this finding with the participant’s spontaneous supposition that 
rational agreement is possible? In dealing with similar situations, Habermas has 
introduced a notion of “reflective participation” of participants whose previously 
umeflective behaviour comes to be informed by what they learn upon reflection to be 
the case. We might extend that notion here to participants in political discourse whose 
linguistic behaviour is informed by the knowledge that ineducible value differences 
regularly give rise to intractable disagreements on normative questions. What 
pragmatic presuppositions might such participants bring to political discourse that 
would not simply transform it into more or less refined forms of manipulation? Or to 
bring this line of thought back to om* original problem, is there a conception of public 
debate that is compatible both with this knowledge and with the supposition that
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some form of rationally motivated agreement, agreement based on good reasons, is 
possible?
II
Here, we can suggest a line of reasoning that modifies the discourse ethical approach. 
To begin with, we have to modulate the idea of rationally motivated agreement 
beyond the basic distinction between a strategically motivated compromise of 
interests and an argumentatively achieved consensus on validity. If the ultimate 
moral-political significance of agreement based on reasons is to provide an 
alternative to open or latent coercion as a means of social co-ordination, there is room 
for more than these varieties.
Here, we can mention two additional types. First, there is a familiar case where the 
preservation of the natural environment conflicts with economic development. The 
dispute that usually arises here is not only about competing particular interest but 
about what is “really” in the general interest. Even if the participants are well- 
intentioned and competent they may, due to their different evaluative and 
interpretative perspective, disagree about the conmion good (which is the case, for 
instance, in the multitude of situations where the preservation of a particular habitat 
conflicts with a proposed development that offers increased employment 
opportunities). If the parties to the disputes want genuinely to debate the point, they 
will, as Habermas maintains, have to suppose that it is in principle possible to
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convince and be convinced by good reasons. As reflective participants, however, they 
may at the same time doubt that in the case at hand complete consensus is achievable. 
Being good-willed members of the same political community, they will also keep in 
mind that if  their deliberative process does fail to produce a consensus, they will have 
to reach a reasoned agreement of another sort if they want to do more than simply to 
vote. If that agreement is to serve as a stable basis for social co-operation, it will have 
to be some form of compromise, not among strategically acting utility maximizers, 
but among community-minded citizens who want to live together in harmony even 
when they disagree about the common good. The point we are getting at is that 
rationally motivated agreement as a moral-political alternative to coercion may well 
involve elements of conciliation, compromise, consent, accommodation, and the like. 
Argument, including argument about what is in the general interest can play a role in 
shaping any and all of them. For instance, when competing conceptions of the 
common good are at issue, arguments may serve to get others to see the authenticity 
or inauthenticity of core values and hence to give them the appropriate weight in 
shaping a political accord. In this respect, the participants in discussions of the 
common good do not have to suppose that there is only one conect view. Nor that 
agreement on what should be done in the best interest of society requires that 
“unanimity” or “consensus” be reached. The only supposition that seems necessary 
for the genuine public deliberation of the common good is that the force of the better 
argument can contribute to the final shape of whatever type of agreement is reached.
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The second type of disagreement we frequently witness in disputes on controversial 
moral issues such as animal rights. Unlike the first type of disagreement about the 
common good which could be called an “ethical-political” dispute since it is 
concerned only with what is good for a particular political community, this second 
type of disagreement could be called moral-political because it is concerned with 
norms that at least one party takes to be moral in the discourse-ethical sense- that is, 
to be binding on all human beings.
There are a number of subclasses here. For example, what one party considers to be a 
moral issue, another party may regard as a pragmatic issue or as a question of values 
open to choice or as a moral issues of another sort, or the opposing parties may agree 
on the issue but disagree as to the morally correct answers. These types of 
disagreements are usually rooted in different “general and comprehensive moral 
views” (Rawls). If not even moral philosophers have been able to agree on the nature 
and scope of morality, any realistic conceptualisation of the democratic public sphere 
will have to allow for disagreement in this regard too. Furthermore, since political 
discourse always takes place under less than ideal conditions, it will always be open 
to dissenters to view any given collective decision as corrupt by de facto  limitations 
and thus as not acceptable under ideal conditions. Disagreements of these sorts are 
likely to be a permanent feature of democratic public life. They are in general not 
resolvable by strategic compromise or rational consensus. All that remains in that 
case are more or less subtle forms of coercion, e.g. majority rule and the threat of 
legal sanctions.
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But we might rescue a sense of “rationally motivated agreement” even for situations 
of this sort. Reflective participants will be aware of the “particularity” of general and 
comprehensive moral views, of their rootedness in particular traditions, practices and 
experiences. If they consider the basic political institutions and procedure of their 
society to be just, they may well regard collective decisions arising from them as 
legitimate, and hence as “deserving of recognition” even when they disagree. That is, 
their background agreement with the operative political conception of justice may 
rationally motivate them to consent to laws they regard as unwise or unjust in the 
hope, perhaps, that they will be able to use the same resources eventually to change 
them. In such situations, aiguments may be used to convince others of the justice or 
injustice of a norm, for example by getting them to adopt the perspective from which 
its consequences appear acceptable or unacceptable. The expectation that some 
participants, perhaps, even the majority, could be convinced by these means seems a 
sufficient basis for genuine debate.
These considerations are mentioned here to show that, in order to serve as a 
normative model of rational will formation and collective decision making, the 
discourse-ethical conception of practical discourse should be adjusted to incoiporate 
alternatives to coercion not captured by the notion of negotiated compromise and 
rational consensus. There are forms of reasoned agreement among free and equal 
persons that are motivated by good reasons in ways different from the way singled 
out by the discourse-ethical strong conception of argumentation. In pursuit of such
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arguments, citizens may enter public debate with a variety of expectations, of which 
the possibility of unanimity is only one. And this diversity in types of agreement and 
expectation is reflected in the diversity of foims of political conflict resolution. 
Institutional decision-making procedures that embodied this diversity would be a 
more realistic ideal than one embodying a strong and insufficiently contextualised 
notion of the rational consensus.
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Environmental Ethics
From the point of view of many environmental philosophers, the problem of 
environmental responsibility cannot be dealt with adequately unless we critically 
address the antluopocentrism of conventional ethical outlooks that, they claim, 
prevent morally sufficient protection for the natural environment. Let us, therefore, 
now turn to those positions which more or less plead for a completely novel type of 
ethics or of philosophical orientation in general which should in a specific way 
respond to environmental concerns.
Some environmental philosophers ai'gue that the problem with anthropocentric moral 
theories is that they recognise the well being of humans alone as the proper object of 
moral action and the well-being of entities other than humans only as these contribute 
to human well-being. Any attempt at grounding moral concern for the environment 
by appeals to exclusively human interests, they argue, misses the point since it fails to 
recognise that the non-human world has value independently of its usefulness for 
limited human pmposes (Naess, 1986). Aiiie Naess famously labelled conventional 
environmental views “shallow” because they overlook the fact that we should care 
about non-human life “for its own sake” (Naess, 1986.). A proper environmental 
ethic requires, it is claimed, a radically novel, non-anthropocentiic foundations.
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The examination of the idea of a non-antlii'opocentric environmental ethics has 
opened a number of very interesting and controversial theoretical and normative 
questions. As Elliot (Elliot, 1995) has pointed out, attempts to develop an 
enviromnental ethics which would not be hiunan-centred generate "foundational 
discussions in meta-ethics and metaphysics, force reappraisals of notions such as self 
and individual, demand reappraisals of the place of non-humans in ethical theories, 
invite considerations of the relationship between ecology and ethics, invite reflection 
on the relationship between humans and nature, and add new dimensions to thinking 
about appropriate political aiTangements".
However, as one could expect, so far there is no consensus among philosophers 
whether we need a novel non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, or whether the 
cuiTent types of normative theory may cope with the challenge of environmental 
issues. The following sections provide an overview of philosophical debate on this 
issue.
I
Conventional Theory and Environmental Ethics
Most of the conventional views of ethics hold that the relationship between human 
beings is the only appropriate subject for ethical deliberation, and consequently that 
human beings are the only proper objects of moral concern. However, as already
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mentioned, in recent years considerable attention has been paid to the question of 
whether we need a decided shift in ethical thinking in order to properly incorporate 
environmental concerns. The debate has revealed that there are two, flindamentally 
different approaches to environmental ethics.
First, there is an approach to the ethical aspects of the environmental problems that 
stays in the realm of traditional moral theories. Advocates of this orthodox approach 
deny a need for a radically new environmental ethics, and argue that conventional 
ethical views are adequate (suffice) for integrating enviromnental concerns. Their 
argument is based on belief that, since humans' destructiveness in relation to their 
environment directly and indirectly harms human beings, there is no need for a 
radical reassessment of our familiar moral principles and norms. Prudence and a 
concern for other humans are sufficient to motivate environmentally sound practices. 
Characteristically, this position appeals for "a more informed, more accurate thinking 
out of our moral obligations and moral rights." (McCloskey, 1983). According to 
John Passmore (1980), "what it needs, for the most part, is not so much a new ethic as 
a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic. For the major sources of our 
ecological disasters- apart from ignorance- are greed and short-sightedness- which 
amount to much the same thing...There is no novelty in the view that greed is evil."
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There is a number of attempts to adapt established moral frameworks such as 
contractarian moral theory, virtue ethics^ and utilitarianism to incorporate 
environmental concerns. So, for instance, Russ Manning,(Manning, 1981); Brent A. 
Singer (Singer B., 1988), and Steven Luper-Foy, (Luper-Foy,1995), among others, 
apply Rawls’s version of contract theory to develop an environmental ethics. 
Manning (1981) argues that Rawls’s theory of justice can be applied to give 
justification for the prudent use of oin natural resources. On Manning’s view, 
Rawls’s conception of a well-ordered society must provide for environmental 
protection because the aspects of health influenced by enviromnental impacts are 
social primary goods subject to the control of institutions. Together with opportunity, 
they greatly affect our self-respect which is the majbr social prirnâfÿ good to be 
distributed by society on the basis of the second principle of justice (“the difference 
principle”). Mamiing also argues that the well-ordered society must support 
environmental protection for fliture generations in the form of the just saving 
principle. Future generations have a just claim upon our use of natural resources 
because the time in which a person is born is a natinal arbitrary contingency which 
should not exclude the consideration of future generations from the original 
agreement, and which must be compensated for as an arbitiary circumstance under 
the principles of justice (Manning, 1981). Brent Singer claims that, by supplementing 
Rawls’s list of primary goods to include directly such things as regular access to 
clean water and safe air to breathe and by taking into account the interests of future
^By virtue ethics is meant a group o f moral theories in line with Aristotle's ethics which are primarily 
concerned with the question "what sort o f person should I be?", focusing on the virtues understood as 
dispositions o f character which are necessary conditions o f the good life for individuals.
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generations, strong principles of environmental conservation can be derived from a 
Rawlsian theory of justice. Singer also claims that Rawls’s theory can be extended to 
include “the rights of nomational animals with interests”. Luper-Foy, on the other 
hand, leaves aside a controversial issue of whether Rawls’s theory supports a claim 
that non-human animals have moral standing, and instead applies Rawls’s apparatus 
to matters of global justice. He uses Rawls’s original position to derive normative 
principles such as “the resource-equity principle”: (^ '‘resources are to be handled in a 
way that is equitable both across the globe and across the generations”) and “the 
sustainable consumption-reproduction principle” Ç'each generation may consume 
natural resources, pollute and reproduce at given rate only i f  it coidd reasonable 
expect that each successive generation could do likewise!‘'‘). He argues that the 
present structure of national prerogatives is a substantial obstacle to realising global 
justice (Luper-Foy, 1995).
However, it has been argued that attempts to develop an environmental ethics from 
contractarian theories generally, and Rawls's theory in particular, have failed. 
Brennan (1988), for example, argues that the reason for this failure lies in the 
apparently unsolvable difficulties that they have to widen and broaden theory to bring 
in animals, plants, or eco-systems as hypothetical contractors. According to Brennan, 
in contract moral theory one of the central ideas is that of the autonomy of human 
beings. This autonomy means that human persons are self-controlling, self-governing 
beings whose growth and development is subject to higher-order constraints that are 
themselves internal to the person. The self-conscious, self-critical features of the
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person emphasised by contractarian accounts give some substance to the notion that 
human pains, desires, needs and projects aie of much richer sort than the comparable 
features of other animals. For any kind of contract moral theory, the idea of human 
autonomy suggests that there is no prospect of arguing that the “original position” or 
state of natuie should encompass a community of humans, other animals, living but 
non-sentient beings and natural systems as participants in the social contract. On 
Brennan views, if we are to argue for an extension of ethics that talces us beyond the 
social contract as conceived by Rawls, then we cannot do this simply by adding to the 
list of original participants. Thus, the prospects for an enviromnental ethics based on 
contract theory look “bleak” (Brennan, 1988).
Additionally, Elliot (1984) asserts that Rawls's accoimt of the sense of justice "has 
implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements". Against Rawls's view that we 
are not required to give strict justice to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of 
justice, Elliot ai’gues that we should include non-human animals directly within the 
scope of the principle of justice since their exclusion strains just institutions.
Yet, even if one does not question the inevitably anthropocentric character of 
contractarian theories, the attempts to accommodate them to include 
environmental concern still apparently run into difficulties. Avner de-Shalit (1995) 
argues that these difficulties stem from the contractarians' attempts to consider the 
environmental issue as the question of intergenerational justice, and particularly from 
their attempts to deal with the latter using the same assumptions they use to discuss
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justice within a single generation. He has pointed out that "precisely because the 
contractarians insist on respecting autonomy as a guiding principle, they then find out 
that they cannot know whose autonomy to respect, and thus fail to show respect for 
future people (not to mention non-human animals or nature) by pursuing and 
supporting environmental policies." Fuither, according to Avner de-Shalit, Rawls's 
idea of representing the interests of future generations tlii'ough the interests of 
contemporary "heads of families", and the reduction of questions of intergenerational 
justice to relations between one generation and its direct successor seems not to 
withstand close scrutiny. Obviously, some of our actions affect only the more remote 
future generations, leaving the more immediate friture generations unaffected. In 
addition, many enviromnental policies include planning for a very long period ahead. 
Thus, De-Shalit claims, a theory of intergenerational justice must provide us with a 
justification for obligations not only to our direct successors but to remote futme 
generations as well. Instead of doing that, contractarian theories rely on belief that the 
obligation which contemporaries have to the succeeding generation will be passed on 
from that generation to the next and so on. De-Shalit concludes that this is not enough 
and could be, in fact, risky for an environmental policy since it might be interpreted 
in a way that demands no effort on the part of the first generation to protect the more 
distant future generations.
Surely, the contractarian approach is not the only possible view on enviromnental 
issues derived from a conventional ethical outlook. Thomas E. Hill Jr. (1983), John
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O’Neil (1993), and David E. Cooper (1995), for instance, argue that virtue ethics can 
provide an adequate basis for environmental ethics. Hill argues that willingness to 
destroy the natural environment "may well reveal the absence of traits which aie a 
natural basis for a proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude and appreciation of the 
good in others", and that consequently, moral virtues such as gratitude, sensitivity to 
others and humility should be seen as a natural basis for promoting environmentally 
sound attitudes (Hill, 1983). O’Neil develops an Aiistotelian conception of human 
well-being in terms of a set of objective goods a person might possess, such as 
friends, the contemplation of what is beautiful and wonderful, the development of 
one’s capacities, the ability to shape one’s own life, and so on. On the basis of this 
conception, O’Neil claims, it could be shown that the concern for our own well­
being, properly understood, ties our well-being to that of both non-humans and future 
generations (O’Neil, 1993). Much in a similai* vein. Cooper argues that concern for 
other species is an ingredient in “the good life” and it is required for frill exercise of 
the virtues. (Cooper, 1995)
Yet, it could be argued that, since virtue ethics grounds concern for other species or 
the ecosystem itself by an appeal to “the good life” of human beings, it remains an 
essentially anthropocentric ethical framework. Additionally, being concerned with 
individuals’ “good life” and preoccupied witli its improvement, virtue ethics is 
allegedly narrowly individualistic. And, from a radically environmental view, 
individualism and anthropocentrism can hardly be an appropriate basis for an
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environmental ethics. Environmental ethics, it is claimed, requires a moral theory 
which is at once non-anthropocentric and non-individualistic.
Utilitaiian moral theory can also be used for deriving an enviromnental ethics. Mary 
B. Williams (Williams, 1978), for instance discusses the implications of utilitarianism 
for our actions and policies concerning the fiiture. She argues that, since utilitarianism 
is indifferent to the temporal distribution of happiness, attributing, for example, as 
much value to the happiness of a future person as to the similar happiness of a 
contemporaiy, the utilitarians cannot discount future happiness with respect to 
present happiness. In deciding how to act and which policies to endorse, the 
utilitarian will adopt the principle of maximising expected benefit. A utilitarian may 
urge a policy with a high chance of a small benefit and condemn a policy with a very 
small chance of a substantial benefit. So, utilitarianism may discoimt for the 
uncertainty of how things will turn out in the future, since generally at least, we can 
be much more certain of the short-term effects of our actions and policies than of 
their very long-term effects. The greater uncertainty, the greater the permissible 
discounting. One such discounting response is to treat presently competing actions 
and policies as having negligibly different consequences in the distant future. This 
response, says Williams is completely inappropriate for evaluating resource use 
policies. Instead, she argues, utilitarianism combined with certain relevant facts of 
biology entails that choice between competing resource use policies should be guided 
by the principle of maximum sustainable yield.
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However, rather than its sophisticated philosophical versions one quite inadequate 
sort of utilitarianism, namely a narrow cost-benefit calculation is more prominent in 
the environmental realm. Though it is hardly a philosophical approach, some 
economists believe that “the benefit cost criterion is not an alien intruder from the 
economic arena...(but) rather, it is directly derived from ...utilitarian political 
philosophy” (Peterson and Randal, quoted in; Sagoff, 1989)
This form of utilitarianism addresses the environmental issues by urging us to thinlc 
of the constituents of nature as actually or potentially valuable resources and to 
articulate them entirely in terms of individual preferences. Tribe (Tribe, 1974), 
defines the environmental ethics derived fiom this fundamental principle as "a system 
of attitudes and assumptions which treat human want-satisfaction as the only 
legitimate referent of policy-analysis and choice". The version of preference 
utilitarianism lies behind the various market-based approaches to environmental 
policy to portray environmental issues as solvable by the sort of cost/benefit analysis 
represented by the contingent valuation method.
The current cost-benefit embodiment of utilitarianisms speaks of utility or welfare not 
in terms of a state of the individual (like pleasiue) but in terms of the degree to which 
the preferences of the individual are satisfied. The individuals’ preference 
satisfaction, measured in monetary units in actual or hypothetical markets, constitutes 
the criterion by which we are to judge the well being of individuals. Public policy is 
to be based on the aggregation of preferences, with the aim of increasing overall
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welfare by maximising the satisfaction of preferences over society as a whole. In this 
framework, alternative actions are evaluated according to the ratio of their costs to 
their benefits. Costs and benefits, on the other hand, are understood as preference 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, measured by willingness to pay or accept 
compensation. Importantly, benefits and costs are weighted differently depending on 
the time at which they occur, and future benefits and costs are valued less the further 
into the friture they occur. The friture is, therefore, “discounted”. As Goodin, (1983) 
has put it, in this "updated version of utilitarianism”, the classical "Greatest 
Happiness" principle is translated into the principle of "Maximising Expected 
Benefits" and is widely used as the rule for making decisions. And those options 
which “maximise happiness” in the modern sense of having the highest cost-benefit 
ratio are recommended .
Applying the theory to environmental issues, defenders of utilitaiianism in its present 
cost-benefit version must confront a number of both theoretical and practical 
problems. The first set of difficulties results from the assumption that preference 
satisfaction should serve as a basis of environmental policy. Basing enviromnental 
policy on the satisfaction of individual preferences appears to be very problematic. 
Firstly, it is questionable whether individual preference can provide a firm ground for 
environmental decision-making. Goodin (1983) has pointed out that in expressing 
their preferences people always act at least pailially in ignorance of all relevant facts. 
Since preferences arise out of experience, people usually do not have a very clear idea
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of their preferences for things that lie far outside either their past experiences or 
present possibilities.
Further, the utilitaiian rule states that our actions should maximise the "well-being" or 
"utility" of all affected persons, assuming that it is possible to calculate or measure 
personal utilities defined in terms of preference satisfaction. This leads to intricate 
practical problems of measuring and comparing the preferences, wants and utilities of 
different individuals. Advocates of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), for instance, 
presuppose that preferences can be expressed commensurably in monetary terms. 
They have developed various valuation procedures such as "Willingness to pay" and 
"Willingness to accept" techniques (Peai'ce et al, 1989) to calculate and measure 
personal preferences. Yet, the validity of values obtained by this way is highly 
questionable, and critics have expressed a lack of belief in the validity of values 
obtained by this way, arguing that these valuation techniques camiot reflect 
preferences accurately. Proponents of CBA accept that there is a "credibility 
problem" related to measuring preferences, but claim that the problem can be 
resolved "with greater research and communication effort" (Pearce, 1992).
Yet, even if one accepts this claim, the CBA approach has to cope with some serious 
theoretical difficulties. Sagoff (1988), for instance, argues that cost-benefit analysis is 
foimded on a misconception, since it fails to recognise a distinction between the 
preferences an individual has in the role of consumer and those that she has as a 
citizen. Sagoff writes:
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“As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own 
interest; with the good of the community, rather than simply the well-being of 
my family...In my role as a consumer, I concern myself with personal or self- 
regarding wants and interests; I pursue the goals I have as an 
individual...(and) act upon those preferences on which my personal welfare 
depends.”
There is, according to Sagoff a logical difference between consumer and citizen 
preferences:
“When an individual states his or her personal preference he or she may say, 
“/  want (desire, prefer...) x.” When the individual states a view of what is 
right or best for the community-what the govermnent should do- he or she 
may say, “ ITie want (prefer, desire) x”. Sentences that express the interest or 
preference of the community make a claim to intersubjective agreement-they 
are coiTect or mistaken-since they take the community (“we” rather the “I”) as 
their logical subject.”
For Sagoff, it is in the role of citizen that the individual considers environmental 
issues. This can explain why, for instance, respondents to willingness-to-pay surveys 
often either refuse to put a price on enviromnental goods when asked how much they 
would be willing to pay for it, or they put an infinite price on it. Sagoff argues that 
these facts confirm that the preferences which individuals display in the market as 
consumers are distinct from the values they operate with as citizens.
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Furthermore, it is doubtflil whether CBA in enviromnental decision-making is 
capable of incorporating into its cost-benefit calculations the interests of those unable 
to articulate preferences, such as non-humans and friture generations. Almond (1995) 
has argued that, in the case of friture generations, the utilitarian ar gument is dubious 
because of the transparent impossibility of loiowing what the wishes or preferences of 
future generations are likely to be, or even whether such generations will exist and in 
what numbers. Almond has also argued that the utilitarian argrmient is additionally 
problematic because if the preferences of future generations were to rank equally 
alongside the present generations, “the calculations demanded by the theory would be 
overwhelmed by the infinite number of preferences that would need to be taken into 
account”.
Sophisticated versions of the CBA approach have attempted to show that the value 
and interests of non-humans and future generations can be incorporated into cost- 
benefit analysis thiough the preferences of the present generation of humans. 
Nevertheless, O'Neill (1993) has demonstrated that while there is nothing 
"conceptually incoherent" in these attempts, they fail for two reasons. Firstly, the 
representation of non-humans and future generations is precarious. Secondly, the 
weights given to their interests are inadequate. The way in which interests of non­
humans and future generations are incoiporated into cost-benefit analysis appears to 
provide "an ethically indefensible bias" against them (O'Neill, 1993).
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However, there is another application of utilitarianism in the environmental realm 
that appears particulaiiy interesting. Peter Singer (1975, 1993) applies utilitarian 
theory to relations between humans and animals, i.e. to issues such as conservation of 
species, vegetarianism, and animal experimentation. Singer uses utilitaiian theory to 
generate "a new ethics for our treatment of animals" (Singer, 1975) that supports 
equality of consideration for all sentient life-fonns. Since this extension of “moral 
considerability” to all sentient animals is commonly taken to be the first step in 
overcoming allegedly unjustifiable human chauvinism in environmental ethics, it 
deserves our full attention.
II
Extension of Ethical Constituency
Sentientism
Singer’s position can be called sentientism since it includes all sentient beings in its 
ethical constituency. The approach arises directly out of classical utilitarianism as 
presented by Bentham in which good is defined as pleasiue and bad or evil as pain. 
When good and evil are defined in this way, the class of morally considerable entities 
includes all creatures that are sentient, capable of feeling pain and pleasure. In his
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“The principles of morals and legislation” (1789), Jeremy Bentham famously asked 
for the basis of a morally relevant line between humans and animals.
" Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full- 
grown horse.,is..a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal than an 
infant of a day...old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it 
avail? The question is not. Can they reason? nor. Can they talk? but, can they 
suffer?"
The implicit argument here is that since the basis for moral consideration is the 
capacity for suffering then it is illogical to limit it to human beings. Cooper (1995) 
has pointed out that the argument illustrates a typical strategy deployed by theorists 
who urge us to move away from supposedly unjustifiable anthropocentrism in 
environmental ethics. The strategy is to show that the basis of moral concern for 
humans properly requires an extension of that concern to other classes of living 
beings. Thus, Singer (1995) argues:
"If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that 
suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the 
principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like 
suffering- in so far as rough comparisons can be made- of any other being".
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Singer argues specifically against factory faiming and animal experimentation. With 
regard to factory farming he advocates that, where there are nutritionally adequate 
alternatives to eating meat, the pleasures of our palate camiot outweigh the suffering 
inflicted on animals by the standard procedures of commercial farming; hence 
vegetarianism is the only ethically acceptable diet. In relation to animal 
experimentation Singer produced the first really sustained argument that most 
humans are guilty of “speciesism”. It is of little significance, the argument goes, that 
humans belong to a different biological species from say, chimpanzees, dogs, farm 
animals and laboratory mice; we do not have the right to treat such species merely as 
we choose and for our own ends.
The view that animals deserve moral consideration is often labelled with the words 
"animals rights". Yet, it is often held by philosophers that the notion of “rights” 
whether or not applied to animals, is problematic. As Mary Midgley (Midgley, 1983) 
notes :”This is the really desperate word. As any bibliography of political theory will 
show, it was in deep trouble long before animals were added to its worries”. The 
reason for this apparently rather despairing view is partly that the word is used in a 
variety of overlapping ways, partly that historically it has been inextricably linked 
with the notion of legal rights and partly that rights are commonly taken to be 
correlative with duties while many philosophers follow Kant in rejecting the notion of 
duties to animals. It is, of course, possible to argue that animals “have rights” - Tom 
Regan (Regan, 1983), for instance, argues that all animals- or at least mammals above
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a certain age- are “subjects of life” (i.e. self-conscious beings, capable of having 
beliefs and desires, deliberate actors who can conceive of the future and entertain 
goals) and therefore have basic rights.
However, extending the rights discourse to non-human animals may not be the 
clearest or most helpful way of highlighting the ethical issues concerning our 
treatment of animals. A different approach (used by Singer) is to by-pass the question 
and focus instead on the extent to which our use of animals is often “speciesist”.
We can thinlc, for instance, of the conditions we normally require before humans are 
permitted to be used as research subjects. We require that two conditions be met: 
first, that the participating individual gives their informed consent; secondly, that 
there is no intent to do harm to that individual. The second of these conditions is 
inviolate. The first can be only overturned when patients are unable to give their 
consent, for instance because they are babies or in a coma, when it can be given on 
their behalf. The problem is why do most people hold that it is not permissible to 
experiment on people without their consent when we regularly do these things to non­
humans, including even our closest evolutionary relatives, namely chimpanzees and 
other mammals? One of the possible answers would be to pick out one or more 
characteristics that are thought to differentiate non-humans from humans, such as 
rationality, language use or autonomy.
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Yet, the proponents of animal welfare ethics are usually quick to point out the logical 
inconsistency of this argument. Their contra-ai'gument is that a certain feature, like 
speech or rationality, camiot be relevant to moral concern, since not all human beings 
possess it. They argue that whatever faculty we choose to underscore our own 
uniqueness as the basis of our moral superiority (e.g., rationality, language, or our 
tool-making capability), we will invariably find either that there are some humans 
(e.g. infants, the brain damaged, the mute) who do not possess such a faculty or there 
are some non humans who do. How then, they ai*gue, do we justify regarding all 
humans (regardless of whether they possess the appropriate faculty) as morally 
considerable and all non-humans as not? (Gruen, 1994). The point being made here is 
that it is illogical and inconsistent to confine moral consideration to human beings.
That is the reason why Singer argues that experimentation on animals cannot be 
justified simply by parading the benefits to humans which such experimentation may 
reasonably be expected to provide; it would have to be shown that the benefits to 
humans outweigh the harm done to the animals. According to Singer "... an 
experiment camiot be justifiable unless the experiment is so important that the use of 
a retarded human being would also be justifiable." This is, obviously, a very 
controversial principle. However, Singer is not advocating that mentally retarded 
humans be used in experimentation, although some have accused him of holding this 
view. He urges that, in considering whether a given experiment is justifiable, we ask 
ourselves whether we would be prepared to perform it on an orphaned human being 
at a mental level similar to that of the proposed animal subject. Only if the answer
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was affirmative could we claim that our readiness to use the animal was not based on 
a speciesist prejudice. The point being made is that it is wi'ong to decide to 
experiment on animals rather than on humans with similar abilities to comprehend 
their situation if the readiness to experiment is based only on the fact that the animal 
is a different species.
The term “speciesism” is of course chosen as an analogy of “sexism” and “racism”, 
and to refer to attitudes and behaviours that once were commonly deemed acceptable 
but are now generally considered morally imsustainable. Yet, as Midgley (1983) has 
pointed out, the analogy is not very sound, simply because of the fact that whereas 
loiowledge of a person’s race is generally imelevant to their treatment, “with an 
animal, to know the species is absolutely essential”.
We can also note that if  one adopts solely the criterion of suffering to decide whether 
or not an organism should be used for human ends, a case could be made, abhonent 
as it soimds, for mentally handicapped new-born human infants to be used for such 
research, on the grounds that such infants are arguably incapable of suffering yet are 
physiologically closer to self-conscious sentient people than are the laboratory 
animals presently used. In the 1991 Report of the UK working Paity of the Institute 
of Medical ethics into the ethics of using animals in biomedical research (Smith & 
Boyd, 1991), it is argued that this conclusion can be rejected on the grounds that.
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“ ...being of the human species may be a sufficient condition of being 
awarded enlianced moral status...Possessing the nature o f  a rational self- 
conscious creature may be sufficient for being awarded this status even 
though this nature may be impaired or underdeveloped in the individual case”.
Additionally, some people would ai*gue that is not a single featui'e: that distinguishes 
humans from non-humans, nor is it the mere property of being human that marks 
humans out for special concern. Rather it is the existence of a range of features, 
bound up with humanity, which does so. They would remind us of a whole range of 
features- rationality, self-regard, responsibility, moral sense, aesthetic sense, 
autonomy, for example- which, they would argue, are distinctive of human existence.
It is evident that there is still considerable controversy, both over whether animals 
have rights and whether animals are qualitatively different from humans in some way 
that allows us to treat them differently. We can leave this debate at this point and 
instead focus on relationship of sentientism to environmental ethics. Obviously, 
sentientism widens the concern of an exclusively human ethics. However, some 
radical environmental philosophers argue that its embracing of sentient animals does 
not itself provide ground for a genuine environmental ethic. Baird Callicott, (Callicot, 
1980) for instance claims that there are intractable differences between environmental 
ethics and animal liberation/ right movement both in theory and practical 
applications. While environmental ethics is holistic or collective and locates ultimate 
value in the biotic community, animal liberation/right ethics remains atomistic and
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locates moral value in individuals. Further, pursued at the practical level animal 
liberation/right ethics, according to Callicott, is “utterly impracticable” and “would 
have ruinous consequences on plants, soils, and waters”.
Holmes Rolston (Rolston, 1993) also regards sentientism as an insufficient basis for 
an environmental ethics. He argues that the pains, pleasures, interests, and welfare of 
individual animals make up only one of the considerations in a more complex 
environmental ethics that cannot be reached by conferring rights on them by a 
hedonistic calculus, however far extended. According to Rolston “we have to travel 
further into a more biologically based ethics.” (Rolston, 1993)
However, Singer’s extended version of utilitarianism is just the first step in 
developing an alternative to anthropocentrism. Starting from the same utilitarian 
philosophical premises, Robin Attfield (Attfield, 1983; 1987), for instance, develops 
an “ethics of the environmental concern” that extends moral regard not only to 
sentient animals but also to all living things.
Biocentrism
According to Attfield, the capacity to live, not the capacity to suffer, ought to be tlie 
criterion of "moral considerability". The assumption that harm and interests 
presuppose a capacity for experience, Attfield argues, is false since it fails to
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recognise that any organism, be it an animal or a plant, which has the capacity to 
flourish may be said to have an interest and good of its own which ought to be 
respected. Since “moral standing or considerability belongs to whatever has a good of 
its own,” (Attfield, 1987), all living things should be regarded as "morally 
considerable”.
A biocentric ethical outlook is also advocated by Paul Taylor (Taylor, 1986), though 
he anives at it by using Kant’s theory rather than utilitarianism. Taylor defends the 
adoption of a biocentric ethical attitude of respect for nature. He grounds this attitude 
in the intelligibility of regarding each living entity as striving, not necessarily 
consciously, to realise its own good and as having the same inherent worth within a 
network of “teleological centres of life”. According to Taylor, basic tenets of 
biocentrism are:
1. Humans are members of earth’s living community in the same way and on the 
same terms as all other living things;
2. Humans and other species are interdependent;
3. Each organism is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way;
4. Humans are not inherently superior to other living things (Taylor, 1986).
From this biocentric philosophy Taylor has developed three principles of ethical 
conduct:
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1. Do not harm any natural entity that has a good of its own:
2. Do not try to manipulate, control, modify, manage or interfere with the normal 
functioning of natural ecosystems, biotic communities, or individual wild 
organisms;
3. Do not deceive or mislead any animal capable of being deceived or misled.
These principles led Taylor to call for an end of hunting, fishing and trapping, to 
espouse vegetaiianism, and to seek the exclusion of human activities from wilderness 
areas.
At first glance, biocentrists face an obvious practical dilemma posed, on the one 
hand, by the human need to eat (and otherwise to consume) and, on the other hand, 
by the human obligation to consider the interests of fellow living beings. Tliis 
dilemma is not as destructive as it may at first seem. Paul Taylor, for instance 
suggests “Five Priority Principles for the Fair Resolution of Conflicting Claims”:
1. The principle of self-defence which says that it is usually peimissible for moral 
agents to defend themselves;
2. The principle of proportionality according to which basic interests, those interests 
necessary for survival, take precedence over other interests;
3. The principle of minimum wrong which prescribes that when basic interests are in 
conflict, the least amount of haim should be done to all parties involved;
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4. The principle of distributive justice which tells us that whenever possible, the 
disadvantages resulting from competing claims should be borne equally by all 
parties;
5. The principle of restitutive justice formulated as “the greater the harm done to a 
moral agent, the greater is the compensation required”.
However, as Brennan (1988) has shown, Taylor’s principles raise more disputes than 
they settle. So, for instance, it is extremely difficult to know when some non-basic, 
or peripheral interests are worthy of interference in the basic interests of some 
organisms. Further, if we take the claims of all living things as being equal, then on 
an impartial view it is hard to see that we could ever justify sacrificing the basic (life 
or death) interests of any for the non-basic interests of others. Even if  we think that 
some non-basic interests do deserve to win over basic interests, we still face a 
problem of specifying and defending such choices. The same kind of problem arises 
for Taylor’s principle of distributive justice. According to this principle, if 
satisfaction of basic interests requires the use of the same limited resources, then 
these resources should be apportioned fairly. This leads to an immediate conclusion 
in favour of vegetarianism: if it takes seven tomies of cereal to produce one tonne of 
beef, then clearly meat-eating uses up resources shared by humans and other creatures 
in a way that is quite unnecessarily wasteful. The less land used by humans, the 
greater the prospect for the flourishing of Other forms of life. But the confrnned meat 
eater may consider that it is perfectly proper to reduce resources available to other life 
forms for the sake of certain exquisite gustatory delights (Brennan, 1988).
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Taylor’s final principle (of restitutive justice) requires that we try to compensate 
other organisms for harm that we might have done them. Strictly speaking, 
compensation is not possible at all in some cases. For if I kill an organism, it is no 
compensation to it that I have set aside a protected area where others of its kind may 
live. Respect for living things, of the sort urged by Taylor, seems to sit uneasily with 
the doctrine of compensation. Thus, according to Brennan (Brennan, 1986), Taylor 
has failed to come up with principles that are grounded in ecological reality. On 
Brennan’s views, we cannot fulfil our human potential, or strive to improve oin 
characters, our relationships and our awareness, without engaging in activity that 
inevitably damages other organisms. Every organism draws its continued life from 
interactions with other organisms; what we need from an environmental ethics is an 
understanding of the limits to be observed in our own interference with other 
organisms, and with the abiotic environment upon which we all depend (Brennan, 
1988).
Yet, the deeper problem with biocentrism seems to lie in its assumption shared both 
by Taylor and Attflied that possession of “inlierent worth” or “a good of its own” 
entails moral considerability. Attfield asserts that “moral standing or considerability 
belongs to whatever has a good of its own.” Taylor (1986), on the other hand, claims 
that
“the assertion that an entity has inherent worth is here to be understood as
entailing two moral judgements: 1. that the entity is deserving of moral
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concern and consideration, or in other words, that it is to be regarded as a 
moral subject, and 2. that all moral agents have a prima facie duty to promote 
or presei*ve the entity’s good as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity 
whose good it is.”
This appears to be mistaken simply because it is possible to talk in a descriptive 
sense of what constitutes the goods of entities, without making any prescriptive 
claims that these should be realised. As O’Neil has put it , we can know what is 
“good for X” and relatedly what constitutes “flourishing for X” and yet believe that X 
is the sort of thing that ought not to exist and hence that the flourishing of X is just 
the sort of thing we ought to inhibit (O’Neil, 1993). Thus, one can recognise that 
something has its own goods, and quite consistently be morally indifferent to these 
goods or believe one has a moral duty to inhibit their development.”
Biocentrism has also to meet an objection which comes from the eco-centric camp. 
Some eco-centric ethicists insist that we need to be able to take account of the fact 
that whole systems of organisms or species may appear as being more significant 
than individual creatures. (Rolston, 1993). The others attempt to show that nature, 
while the mother and sustainer of life, seems indifferent to individual life, and that 
death is at the heart of organic processes. Hence, an ethics that regards life as the 
summum bonum, and death, life's opposite, as, coiTespondingly, the greatest evil, can 
hardly be an "ethics of respect for nature" as in the title of Taylor’s version of 
biocentrism. (Callicott, 1992).
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Furthermore, according to the eco-centric critique, biocentrism does not directly 
address the most important contemporary environmental problems. The extinction of 
species, the degradation of ecosystems, soil erosion, water and air pollution, and so 
on, ai'e on the top of the list of enviromnental problems- to most of them biocentrism 
is mostly iiTelevant. The issues raised by a radical environmental position for 
sentientism reappear here with only a slight modification The problem with the 
attempt to include in ethical constituency all living things, from an eco-centric point 
of view, is not that it is not sufficiently inclusive but that it is "atomistic", focused 
exclusively on individuals while environmental concerns focus primarily on 
collective entities- species, ecosystems, watersheds, in a word, on wholes (Callicott,
1992). Since biocentrism is unable to represent environmental concerns excepts as 
those concerns serve the good of individuals it is an inappropriate basis for 
environmental ethics. A properly environmental ethics, it is claimed, should include 
significantly more than the mere application of one or another traditional moral 
theory to environmental affairs. In fact, it requires a radically novel, "holistic" as 
well as nonanthropocentric perspective.
Ecological holism
Ecological holism differs structurally from the other forms of non anthropocentric 
ethics. All of them focus on individuals, and "holism" may be thought to signal a
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different focus. The term ecological holism is used hereafter to indicate a group of 
ecologically oriented normative theories based on a common fundamental assumption 
that holism (i.e. preference for the systems, collectives or wholes of which 
individuals are a part) is somehow demanded by an ecological outlook. It represents 
different philosophical perspectives such as Deep Ecology (Naess, 1973, 1986; Naess 
and Rothenberg, 1989; Fox, 1984; Devall & Sessions, 1985), Land Ethics of Aldo 
Leopold (Leopold, 1989), and Holistic Environmental Ethics as elaborated by J.Baird 
Callicot, (Callicot, 1980,1989), Holmes Rolston (1986,1988), and a number of other 
radical environmental philosophers. Although there aie some significant differences 
among those theories, all of them share a common belief that ethical aspects of the 
environmental crisis cannot be dealt with adequately within the frameworks of 
conventional ethical systems.
The point of departure of ecological holism, or eco-centrism as it is also labeled, is 
belief that the antliropocentric world-view has fostered manipulative and exploitative 
attitudes towards the natural world, and resulted in ecologically unsustainable modes 
of living. What is needed in order to overcome this situation, it is argued, is a radical 
change not only in our social habits but above all in conceptualising our relationships 
with the natural environment.
Some proponents of ecological holism emphasise the intercomiection between ethics 
and metaphysics (Naess, 1973; Fox, 1984; Callicot, 1980; Mathews, 1991), and argue 
that an ecologically effective ethics can only arise on ontological and epistemological
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presuppositions radically different from those which characterise the dominant world­
view. They call for a transformation in science and world views that will replace the 
mechanistic world-view of classical science with an ecological and holistic 
conception of reality. This appears to be one of the most radical ideas of eco-centric 
philosophy. In order to overcome anthropocentrism in the wider sense we need, it is 
claimed, a "better code for reading nature" (Skolimowski, 1981) than one provided by 
the dominant scientific paradigm. The dominant scientific worldview is regarded as, 
at least, partially responsible for “unprecedented fragmentation, nihilism and 
destruction" (Krippner, 1991), and reductionism, mechanistic materialism, excessive 
individualism and antliropocentric aiTogance aie seen as its negative aspects.
Rooted in the sixteenth century and stemming from the “scientific revolution” of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the modern scientific paradigm emerged from 
the works of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, Caitesian philosophy, the scientific 
methodology of Francis Bacon, and the mathematical theory of Isaac Newton. A 
fundamental component of the modern scientific mode of inquiry was observing 
nature in general as a mechanical system composed of separate physical entities, 
which in turn could be reduced to their component parts and functional units. 
Chaiacteristics and internal relations of these component parts were thought to 
completely determine all natural phenomena.
This scientific approach to nature in which knowledge proceeds by orderly and 
systematic experimentation was revolutionary in replacing the older natural
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philosophy which was based on a priori principles. Unlike its predecessor which 
contemplated natural processes per se, the modern scientific outlook advocated study 
of nature in order to control and dominate it. Capra (1982) summarises this paradigm 
in the following words:
“Matter was thought to be the basis of all existence, and the material world 
was seen as a multitude of separate objects assembled into huge machine. 
Like human-made machines, the cosmic machine was thought to consist of 
elementary parts. Consequently, it was believed that complex phenomena 
could always be understood by reducing them to their basic building blocks 
and by looking for the mechanisms through which these interacted. This 
attitude, known as reductionism, has become so deeply ingrained in our 
culture that it has often been identified with the scientific method. The other 
sciences accepted the mechanistic and reductionist views of classical physics 
as the correct description of reality and modelled their own theories 
accordingly.”
This modern paradigm has been responsible for impressive advances in teclmology, 
industry and scientific discovery, and contributed enormously to the well-being and 
health of humankind. Yet, the ascendancy of this paradigm has also generated some 
adverse effects. Development of experimental-analytical science and science-based 
technology accompanied by the creed that nature must be “bound into service”
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intensified human interventions in the natural environment, v^hich in turn have 
brought about a number of the environmental problems.
Furthermore, the Baconian creed that “scientific knowledge equals power over 
natui'e” was accompanied by the idea of humans as “masters and possessors of 
nature” (Descartes). This idea, it is argued, had far-reaching ethical consequences and 
has been responsible for producing instrumental attitudes to the non-human world. 
The general mechanistic view of nature has been extended to living organisms which 
have been regarded as machines constructed from separate parts. It implied that 
humans are above nature, and that natiue is there for no other purpose but to serve 
humanldnd. It is suggested that this Cartesian view encouraged the belief that nature 
exists primarily to be exploited, manipulated and dominated. This creed has served as 
a rationale for an anthiopocentric ethic which consists of conquering, dominating, or 
merely managing nature for our own benefit. Thus, a different paradigm is seen by 
some eco-centric philosophers as urgently needed for developing ecologically sound 
life-practices which would enable us to live harmoniously with our non-human 
fellows within the complex biosphere we share.
In order to overcome “anthropocentric arrogance”, the eco-centric philosophers 
suggest that an alternative to the mechanistic world-view of classical science should 
be sought in an ecological and holistic conception of reality emerging from various 
forms of non-scientific reflection, contemplation, and understanding, as well as from 
recent developments in science.
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As an inspiration for the new conception, the eco-centrics often enlist the writings of 
the western transcendentalists (such as Thoreau and Emerson), Eastern spiritual 
traditions (e.g. Taoism, Zen Buddhism), or the archaic wisdom of tribal cultures, such 
as native American religions and shamanism. This recourse to the non-scientific 
understanding of the world partially results fiom a distrust in the whole process of 
western rationalisation, and the methodological rationality of western science and 
technology. It is claimed that a more respectful and symbiotic perspective on nature 
that chaiacterises those non-scientific views can help in finding ways of overcoming 
the subject-object relation o f  modern epistemology, and thus inspire harmonious 
attitudes to nature.
Yet, what appears more important is that some of the eco-centric philosophers find 
that the methodological separation between humans as subjects, and nature 
considered as a mere object of value-neutral description and causal explanation has 
already been undermined within science itself.
Some recent scientific developments such as quantum physics, the Gaia hypothesis, 
chaos theory and a number of other recent scientific theories seem to disclose the 
limits of the epistemological conception of the detached scientific observer standing 
above and apart from the object of study. Fox (1984) and Merchant (1992) claim, for 
instance, that one of the ftmdamental principles of quantum physics, namely 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, has shown that observers are not independent of
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their experiments but are inseparably connected with them. They assert that new 
physics' exploration of the atomic and subatomic world has led to a new picture of the 
physical universe as an intrinsically dynamic and interconnected web of relations. 
The classical physics' description of the universe based on the assumption that matter 
is divisible into parts, has allegedly been replaced by a conception based on the 
primacy of process. Capra (1982) argues that, "quantum theoiy has shown that 
subatomic particles are not isolated grains of matter but are probability patterns, 
interconnections in an inseparable cosmic web that includes the human observer and 
her consciousness." He has also pointed out that relativity theory has revealed the 
intrinsically dynamic character of that cosmic web by showing that its activity is the 
very essence of its being. These two basic theories of modern physics have thus 
transcended the Newtonian-Cartesian image of the world as a machine by showing 
that the physical universe is "one indivisible, dynamic whole whose parts are 
essentially intenelated and can be understood only as patterns of a cosmic process." 
(Capra, 1982)
Furthermore, according to the environmentalists, scientific ecology has shown that 
natural systems, particularly biological systems and biological organisms demand 
conceptual models that are essentially holistic. They cannot be conceptualised 
adequately within mechanistic and reductionist frameworks, nor be understood 
completely by analytic dissection into physical components. As Rene Dubois (1969) 
describes the ecological view:
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“It is not sentimentality but hard biological science. Man (sic) and the earth 
are two complimentary components of an indivisible system. Each shapes the 
other in a wonderfully creative symbiotic and cybernetic complex. The 
theology of the earth has a scientific basis in the simple fact that man emerges 
from the earth and then acquires the ability to modify and shape it, thus 
determining the evolution of his own fliture social life through a continuous 
act of creation.”
The Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock (Lovelock, 1979, 1989) has also been taken 
as an example of the emerging holistic and organic scientific paradigm, and of a 
break with classical mechanistic science. This theory asserts that the Ear1h can be 
considered as a system that operates and changes by feedback of information between 
its living elements (flora and faima) and non-living components (climate and 
geology). From an environmentalist perspective, the important message in the Gaia 
hypothesis is that the constituents of the Earth, its living and non-living parts, are 
inextricably intertwined and all function together, influencing the development of the 
whole environment. Moreover, chaos theory has emphasised the inherent 
impredictability of many natural phenomena. This unpredictability is becoming 
apparent with the cumulative and synergistic effects of some of the environmental 
impacts over space and time. Increasing awareness of the complexity of the natural
systems humans are interacting with, and level of uncertainty related to establishing
'  ' '
the link between causes and effects in this context have changed the understanding of 
human impacts on the environment. This has, it is claimed, undermined the confident
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belief of classical science in predicting and controlling the effects and side effects of 
human intervention into the environment.
All these insights, it is argued, urge a different, more holistic and ecological approach 
to the environment. It includes the ecological idea of the natural environment as an 
integrated, organic whole rather than as a mechanical system divided up into 
compact, separate objects. Devall (1980) argues that from a deep ecological 
perspective humans are seen as an integral part of their enviromnent, “not above or 
outside of nature” but as “a part of creation on-going". Naess argues in similar 
fashion by rejecting "the man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, total- 
held image" (Naess ,1973).
The consequence for ethics that should be drawn from the new ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions is that hmnans ought to feel not only compassion but 
respect, reverence, and an obligation of responsible caie with regard to nature as a 
whole, or at least for all living beings, like plants and animals. In the latter case the 
rights of living beings to exist and flourish should be accepted as "an intuitively clear 
and obvious value axiom" (Naess, 1973). This does not only mean that animals ought 
not to be tormented or impaired in regard of their well-being but, moreover, that we 
should care about the survival of all the species of plants and animals, or for the 
integrity of the ecosystems. We ought to preserve the enviromnent not only for the 
sake of humanity's survival or well-being but for the salce of the ecosphere itself, or at 
least of all living beings. It is also claimed that an important normative principle
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should be drawn from the notion of interdependence and interrelationship of natural 
systems, namely, the principle of "biospheric egalitarianism" (Naess, 1973). This 
principle attributes equal importance to every component of the interlinked web of 
nature. The assumption that the principle of inter-species equality is generated by the 
fact of the interdependence and interconnectedness of species is fimdamental to an 
ecocentric ethic. Since human beings, like all other creatures, exist within the 
complex web of interaction and interdependency, we should realise that our species' 
proper place is not above but within nature. Once we recognise the depth and degree 
of the interdependence, it is claimed, we will learn humility towards and respect for 
nature. Hence, "biospheric equality" suggests respect and veneration for other ways 
and forms of life, ascribing them “the equal right to live and blossom” (Naess, 1986). 
The idea that humans are the source or ground of all value is viewed as 
anthropocentric arrogance.
Eco-centric ethics thus attempts to be non-anthi'opocentric by viewing himians as just 
one constituency among others in the biotic conmiunity. Its proponents try to point 
out that ecology represents human beings not only to be members of human 
communities but also to be members of the "biotic community" (Leopold, 1989). 
Following this ecological insight, we should recognise the intrinsic value of 
nonhuman members of the biotic community, and the right of these members to 
pursue their own evolutionary destinies. Hence our ethics should enlarge the 
boundai’ies of the moral community "to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or 
collectively; the land... It implies respect for... fellow members and also respect for
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the community as such" (Leopold, 1989). The holistic character of this ethics is 
encapsulated in Leopold's statement; "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community and wrong when it tends 
otherwise"(Leopold, 1989). According to this theory, we must recognise that animals, 
plants and the ecosystems that sustain them have intrinsic value quite apart from any 
use or instrumental value they might have for human heings. As Dobson (1990) has 
pointed out, "human-providential arguments for investing the environment with 
value7...are disqualified from environmental-ethical soundness by their 
anthi opocentrism. " Those who claim that not only humans but nature may have 
intrinsic value, may be said to overcome anthropocentrism, at least in its strong sense.
Justifying moral concerns about the environment by appealing to the intrinsic value 
of nature is a common feature of non-anthropocentric ethical views. However, the 
term intrinsic value has a variety of senses and in many works in environmental 
ethics it has often gone unnoticed. So, for example, Naess (1986) writes that the well­
being and flourishing of human and non-human life^ on earth have value in 
themselves, and that the non-human world has value independently of its usefrilness 
for human purposes. Similarly, Regan (1981) defines the inherent value of a natural 
object as "independent of any awareness, interest or appreciation of it by any 
conscious being". This clearly meta-ethical notion of intrinsic value is common in
^By "human- providential" arguments are meant arguments such as: the natural environment should be 
preserved because it is " a stockpile o f  genetic diversity for agricultural medical and other purposes"; " 
for scientific study; " for recreation" ; and " for aesthetic pleasure/spiritual inspiration"(Fox, quoted in 
Dobson, 1990)
®Naess uses the term 'life' in "a more comprehensive non-technical way to refer also to what biologists 
classify as 'non-living': rivers (watersheds), landscapes, ecosystems"
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literature on environmental ethics. Attfield (1983) also employs it by claiming that 
objects possessing intrinsic value "would be held to have value independently of any 
awareness or appreciation of them or interest in them on the part of any conscious 
being". However, he distinguishes this "objectivist understanding" (Attfield, 1987) of 
intrinsic value from the notion of non-instrumental value, and defends a position that 
"whatever has interests of its own has moral standing" and that "the realisation of 
those interests has intrinsic value" (Attfield, 1983). Clearly, this position is very close 
to a biocentric position held by Taylor (1981,1986), who argues that all living beings 
aie "teleological centres of life" which have goods of their own that could be 
advanced or harmed, and therefore possess inherent worth. As opposed to Taylor's 
use of the terms of inherent worth and inherent value, Callicott (1984) uses the term 
"inherent value" for non-instrumental value and distinguishes it from "intrinsic value" 
conceptualised as objective value.
To sum up, the proponents of non-antluopocentric ethics employ the term "intrinsic 
value" in different meanings. O'Neill (1993) has demonstrated that the tenu, in fact, is 
used in at least three different basic senses and that "many arguments on 
environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these different senses". According to 
O'Neill, intrinsic value is used as a synonym for (1) non-instrumental value, (2) the 
value an object has solely in virtue of its 'intrinsic properties', i.e. its non-relational 
properties,(3) 'objective value', i.e. value that an object possesses independently of the 
valuations of valuers (O'Neill, 1993). However, he rightly points out that "to hold an 
environmental ethics is to hold that non-human beings have intrinsic value in the first
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sense: it is to hold that non-human beings are not simply of value as a means to 
human ends." (O'Neill, 1993).
The issue of intrinsic value of the non-human world inevitably raises further 
questions: to whom or what it is to be assigned? There is considerable disagreement 
among the proponents of non-antliropocentric ethics about the question of whether 
intrinsic value should be ascribed to animate (biotic) nature only, or whether 
inanimate (abiotic) nature may also be said to possess it. So, for instance, Attfield 
(1983) and Taylor (1986) attach intrinsic value to living things exclusively, arguing 
that the concept of intrinsic worth is intelligible only with respect to them. On the 
other hand, deep ecologists (Naess, 1973, 1986; Devall & Sessions, 1985) argue for 
richness and diversity of life forms as values in themselves. Nevertheless, regardless 
of how this dispute can be resolved, it is hoped that the recognition of the intrinsic 
value of some or all aspects of the non-human world, should encourage respectful and 
cautious attitudes towards the non-human natinal world.
Yet, turning back to the eco-centric position, one may argue that this type of ethics 
has a number of theoretical and practical difficulties that stem from its questionable 
epistemological, ontological and ethical commitments. The first set of difficulties 
arises from the assumption that an ecologically sound ethics requires a holistic 
ontology. Advocates of holism rely on "new sciences" such as quantum mechanics, 
ecology and Gaia hypothesis as a source for the new holistic epistemology and 
ontology that should overcome the separation of humans and nature. It could be 
argued against this faith that it is based on a misinterpretation of these scientific
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theories. So, for instance, the epistemological principles of scientific ecology are not 
limited to holism. Although scientific ecology does adopt a holistic approach to 
phenomena it investigates, the ecologists do not reject a reductionist approach. 
Instead, they seem to assert that a balance between reductionism and holism is 
necessary. Thus, American ecologist Eugene Odum (1975) insists that "ecology must 
combine holism with reductionism if applications are to benefit society". Both the 
reductionist and holistic approach have limitations, and "they must be combined if the 
complete truth is to be revealed" (Odum, 1975). Robert Ricklefs (1980) wiites that 
ecological investigations of phenomena on any level of organisation "may require 
diverse approaches, depending on the kind of questions asked". According to liim, 
ecology should recognise all levels and approaches as facets of a complex science. It 
seems fair to conclude that scientific ecology recognises both holistic and reductionist 
approaches as necessary for accessing and understanding an increasingly complex 
world. A holistic approach alone, especially in its extreme form, is regarded as 
unrealistic, leading scientists to an unproductive investigation of an unmanageable 
complexity.
Further, it is debatable whether a holistic ontology can be derived from ecological 
investigation of the relationships between organisms and their environment. It is not 
obvious at all that, as Fox claims, "ecology directly implies" that "there is no firm 
ontological divide in the field of existence" (Fox, 1984). Nor that statements such as 
"I and nature are one" (Callicot, 1985), and " Ecology does not know an encapsulated 
ego over and against his or her environment...The world is my body" (Rolston, 1989)
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can be legitimately derived from the ecological insights into the relationships 
between organisms and their environment. It is also questionable whether such 
"holistic" conclusions stem from quantum mechanics. It has been argued that 
quantum mechanics does not actually force holistic ontology on us, and that there are 
"a number of interpretations (of quantum mechanics) which are not even open to a 
holistic reading" (O'Neill, 1993).
But even if one grants the holistic metaphysical premises for the sake of argument, a 
number of problems posed to the eco-centric ethics remains unsolved. One of them 
stems from a controversial naturalistic assumption that environmental ethics can be 
derived from ecological principles and concepts. This assumption is open to the 
logical criticism of the so called "naturalistic fallacy", i.e. derivation of values from 
facts. The separation of observable facts from humanly assigned values, or is from 
ought, has been a main support of Western science since the work of David Hume 
(1711-1776). Hume writes that moralists:
"...proceed for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning with proofs 'of the 
being of God' or 'observations concerning human affairs', 'when of a sudden, 
I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is 
and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or 
an ought not...os this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or 
affirmation 'tis necessary that it be observed and explained; and at the same 
time a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how
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this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different
from it" (Hume, 1783, quoted in Pigden, 1994).
G.E. Moore (1962) called this fallacy naturalistic because it was more common 
among philosophers who wished to base morals on the kinds of facts that natural 
science could confirm. The reason you cannot derive an ought from an is or more 
generally, a moral conclusion from non-moral premises, is that moral judgements 
differ flmdamentally from factual propositions. They do not primarily describe how 
the world is but prescribe how it should be. Thus, eco-centric ethics commits the 
same fallacy of deriving prescriptive conclusions from descriptive premises, values 
from facts.
One could reason, however, that eco-centric ethics is intentionally opposed to the 
modern concept of the value-neutral facticity of nature. Therefore the logical 
criticism of the so called "naturalistic fallacy" camiot be applied to it. But even if the 
presupposed derivation of "ought" from "is", and a new ontology are accepted as 
premises, eco-centric ethics still runs into difficulties. Namely, in that case, our duties 
and obligations to other living beings and the biosphere as a whole are derived from 
the presupposed metaphysical identity between all beings (or at least living beings). 
This identity of self and others is taken as the best grounds for obligation to others 
because they become, in fact, duties to oneself. O'Neill (1993) has argued that this 
argument does not provide the right kind of grounds for duties to others since duties 
to oneself are, in fact, less stringent than duties to others. He has demonstrated that
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our recognition of the fact that non-human beings have separate identities rather than 
being simply extensions of ourselves is what makes sense of environmental concerns 
(O'Neill, 1993).
It can also be argued that those deep metaphysical considerations which characterise 
eco-centric ethics usually fail to provide criteria for a responsible way of dealing with 
the unavoidable conflicts between the life-interests of all different living beings, and 
between all of them and those of humankind. Much in this vain Sylvan (1984) has 
commented that "the guidelines as regard day-to-day living and action for a follower 
of deep ecology remain unduly and unfortunately obscure".
To sum up, the debate on environmental ethics revolves around the question of how 
an environmental ethics could be adequately grounded. This question is understood as 
the question of whether an environmental ethics must be nonantluopocentric in order 
to be adequate. One may say that dispute over whether an environmental ethics 
requires an extended ethical perspective has been a hallmark of the short history of 
environmental ethics. Wliere would be the position of discourse ethics in this 
constellation?
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Discourse Ethics and Responsibility to Non-humans
One may ai'gue that the discourse-ethical approach to environmental responsibility 
advocated here is severely limited since it is based on language as a human 
expression which is in and of itself anthropocentric. Angelika Kiebs (Krebs, 1997), 
for instance, argues that discourse ethics “does not deserve any special attention from 
the environmental perspective” since it is “hopelessly anthropocentric” and cannot 
justify even the most moderate form of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, 
namely sentietism (i.e. concerns for sentient animals). In a similar vein, Robyn 
Eckersley (Eckersley, 1992) argues that discourse ethics is unable to work the 
interests of non-hmnans into its framework in any meaningful way because it is 
grounded in human speech acts. According to Eckersley, because the ultimate 
referents in any discourse ethical considerations of ecological problems will always 
be the present or potential participants in the cun'ent dialogue, discourse ethics can 
offer no guarantee that the “non-speaking” interests will be considered in their own 
right.
Even the founder of discourse ethics, Jurgen Habermas, writes in Reply to my 
Critics" (1982) that there is "a yawning gap" between a discourse ethics and an 
environmental ethics "because the in principle egalitarian relation of reciprocity built 
into communicative action- a relation from which the meaning of noimative validity-
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claim and the ideas of freedom and equality derive- camiot be carried over into the 
relation between humans and nature in any strict sense" (Habermas, 1982).
Habermas is, of course, aware of the importance of environmental concerns but he 
says little about them because he believes that a radical rethinking of the human 
relationship to natme is neither possible nor necessary. Radically rethinking this 
relation is not possible, Habermas believes, because this would involve maldng 
knowledge claims which camiot be supported. The kind of knowledge humans can 
gain of external nature are for Habermas quite precisely defined. There exists, he says 
“only one theoretically fruitfiil attitude” in this sphere, that of the objective natmal 
science. He is sceptical about the “possibility of giving a rational form to fraternal 
relations with a non-objectivated nature”, and doubts whether the appropriate way to 
treat environmental problems is by making a radical break with the differentiated 
structures of modern consciousness. Certainly, he says, the onus is on those who 
suggest such a break to show how they propose making knowledge claims in the 
areas he rules out. For example, those who envision an ultimate purposiveness to 
nature have to malce clear how this idea avoids leading “back to metaphysics, and 
thus behind the levels of learning reached in the modem age into a re-enchanted 
world” (Habermas, 1982).
Still, while Habermas is sceptical about non-instmmental attitudes towards nature 
having “theoretical” efficacy, he does not preclude the possibility of developing other 
attitudes and forms of knowledge regarding nature. He does not deny that we can
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“adopt a performative attitude to external nature, enter into communicative relations 
with it, (or) have aesthetic experience and feelings analogous to morality with respect 
to it” (Habermas, 1982). Yet, he is imwilling to entertain the concept of nature as an 
end-in-itself, regardless of how tempting it might be for an environmental ethics. The 
good-for-nature must somehow be derived from the “good-for-humans”.
Thus, Habemias concedes the anthropocentric profile of discourse ethics, but he 
claims that, nevertheless, the “ecological problematic” can be dealt with satisfactorily 
within the discourse ethical antlnopocentric framework (Habermas, 1982). But, 
regrettably, enviromnental ethics has so far remained out of Habermas’s main 
theoretical interest, and the above claim has not received an adequate elaboration in 
Habermas’s writings. Therefore, it would be fruitfiil to construct what a discourse 
ethical position regarding the question of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics 
might be.
As a starting point, we have to recall that discourse ethics concentrates on the 
question of right or just action. Having differentiated moral questions from ethical 
ones, discourse ethics focuses on the former regarding that, under modem conditions 
of life with its irreducible pluralism of life forms and various rival value orientations, 
only the question of justice is amenable to fair and impartial judgement. Discourse 
ethics would, therefore, approach environmental ethical issues as the moral questions,
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i.e. the questions “of the norms according to which we want to live together and of 
how practical conflicts can be settled in the common interest of all" (Habermas, 
1993). The solution to the environmental problems conceived as moral problems 
would therefore follow from a discuisive account of justice. Approaching 
environmental ethical issues in this way would mean that the proper noims for 
regulating the relation between humans and their non-human enviromnent would 
accompany the proper principles for adjudicating the conflicts between humans, and 
follow from the communicatively conceived idea of the human good life.
To put this claim in more concrete socio-historical terms, we might argue as follows. 
Environmental problems are, at their roots, caused by the strain that a continual 
expansion of the economy - which enlists science and technology for its purposes - 
places on the natural environment. This continual expansion of the economy is a 
relatively recent phenomenon that is associated with the rise of modern, industrial 
society. With the development of industrial society a new dynamism is released in the 
economy in which growth, including the expansion of human needs, tends toward the 
unlimited. Or, as Habermas puts it:
“It is only since the capitalist mode of production has equipped the economic 
system with a self-propelling mechanism that ensures long term continuous 
growth (despite crises) in the productivity of labour that the introduction of 
new technologies and strategies, i.e. innovation as such, has been
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institutionalised... Capitalism is the first mode of production in world history
to institutionalise self sustaining economic growth (Habermas, 1976).
Moreover, we could aigue, following Habermas, that in advanced capitalist society, 
institutionalised economic and technological progress becomes the new principle of 
legitimation of the social order as a whole. This is a peculiar principle of legitimation 
indeed, and amounts to something like a huge “category mistake”. Economic and 
technological progress belong to the realm of the technical not the practical or the 
normative, and therefore cannot properly serve as legitimating, i.e. normative, 
principles. Thus, it appears that the advanced industrial society through the 
hypostatisation of economic growth and teclinological progress into “ideology”, has 
for the first time in history attempted to suppress the normative dimension of social 
life. Due to this state of affairs, questions bearing on the character of good life are not 
submitted to public political debates about the “good life”, but are left to the 
administrative decisions of teclinical experts.
Discourse ethics, thiough its reinstatement of the legitimacy of communicative 
reason, seeks to defend the possibility of rational discussion of the good life and the 
goals of social development. And if this renewed noraiative political discussions were 
translated into a program of action which eventuated in a radical transformation of 
society, one of the results of that transformation would presumably be the 
resubordination of the economy - as well as of scientific and technological activity - 
to the collectively conceived idea of the good life.
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Yet, it is worth recalling that discourse ethics neither singles out a selected idea of 
good life, nor prescribes moral norms and principles following which would help in 
achieving “ a good life”. In fact, discourse ethics presupposes no norms other than the 
acceptance of a reasoned, reflective, and practical potential for discourse: that is the 
mutual recognition and acceptance of others as responsible subjects (Habermas,
1993). The acceptance of reasoned argumentation as the sole nomiative prerequisite 
may indeed provoke criticism of discursive ethics from the non-anthiopocentric 
position. It may be argued that “non-anthiopocentric” concerns are a priori ruled out 
from the environmental discourse since discourse participants can only be 
“communicatively competent humans” who, in turn, are concerned exclusively with 
human interests. This objection would, however, be misconceived for the following 
reasons.
Discourse ethics is above all a communicative process in which discourse 
pailicipants share their concerns, expecting mutual acceptance and respect for their 
position. In a process of imcoerced and undistorted communicative interaction 
between individuals in open discoinse, the pailicipants attempt to convince each other 
in the validity of proposed norms aimed to regulate their interactions using the force 
of better argument only. The reasons they use, on the other hand, are inseparably 
linlced to and informed by their experience of a social, cultural and ecological life 
world which constitutes the context of their experience. As O’Hara (1996) put it, this
148
Chapter 7 Responsibility to Non-hiimans
life world context “includes the bio-physical world, albeit expressed in the human 
voices of discourse participants.”
Discourse participants can arrive at the moral point of view (seen as the impartial 
standpoint toward the various interests and desires at stake in a conflict situation) 
only by way o f  reciprocity defined in terms of the argumentative role-taking given 
with the need to find ai-guments convincing in the language of the other participant. 
The moral point of view is thereby “decentred”, for the individual’s weighing of 
interests and alternative norms no longer suffices to define impaitiality. Individuals 
“take” the moral point of view precisely in so far as they give themselves over to such 
a process of dialogical interchange, to the give and take of opinions striving toward 
consensus. Such reciprocity has two complementary sides. On the one side, it allows 
each participant a certain autonomy with respect to need- inteipretation and self- 
understanding, in as much as a rational agreement does not presuppose the 
construction of a single, overarching conceptual framework. On the other side, this 
autonomy results from interaction with others, in as much as the individual’s needs, 
values, or interests become normative only if they find the assent of others.
Habermas has expressed this dual character of moral reciprocity in terms of the 
insepai'ability of the principles of justice and solidarity. According to him, justice and 
solidarity are two sides of the same coin because practical discourse is, on the one 
hand, a procedure that affords everyone the opportunity to influence the outcome and 
thereby takes accoimt of an individualistic understanding of equality; on the other
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hand, practical discourse leaves intact the social bond that induces participants in 
argumentation to become aware of their membership in an unlimited communication 
community.
In the discourse ethical framework, the principle of solidarity can be found in the 
form of a demand that each individual’s claim to moral objectivity must be submitted 
to intersubjective testing. The principle of justice takes the form of the requirement 
that a valid consensus depends on the consent of each individual who, being 
autonomous, has the right to take a position in light of his or her interests. This 
suggests, in turn, that the impartiality defining the moral point of view is likewise 
double-sided. The participants must be able to present their needs and interests in the 
language of others, a task that requires at once a degree of imaginative abstractive 
capability with respect to one’s own need inteipretation and, just as much, the ability 
to imderstand the other’s position - something like empathy, only in a cognitive 
sense. This demanding empathie presupposition is often overlooked by critics of 
discourse ethics who claim that “nothing is gained by the shift from monological 
moral reflection to discourse” (Krebs, 1997).
The normative requirements of discourse ethics are, therefore, very demanding. 
Wlien an individual proposes a nonn as legitimate (for instance a norm which obliges 
us to protect species from extinction), one must submit not only to straight-forward 
rules of fair ai'gumentation, but also to rules whose effect is to open up to critical 
assessment the interpretation of needs which inform a given normative claim. This
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requirement is particularly important because it may bring into question the socially 
dominant interpretation of needs. Discourse ethics requires a test of reciprocity in 
regard to how each individual inteiprets her needs in relation to others who are 
potentially affected by that individual’s normative claim. The need inteipretation 
which is implied in a normative claim thus must be one that can be “communicatively 
shared” if  that claim is to withstand discursive testing and thus be acceptable to all 
participants. The critical conceptual space created by applying discursive rules is 
supposed to allow for dialogue in which participants have at least the possibility of 
reaching more “truthfiil interpretation of their own particular needs as well as 
especially of those which are common and capable of consensus” (Habermas, 1987).
However, whilst legitimacy of noims in discourse ethics is tied to need satisfaction, 
the need satisfaction is not confined simply to material satisfactions. In this regard it 
makes perfect sense to claim that a person who holds a reverential attitude toward 
nature has a “need” to live in a society which treats natme in a way substantially 
different from that of advanced industrial societies (White, 1989). By defending the 
possibility of rational discussion of the good life and by specifying normative 
prerequisites for it, discourse ethics opens space for a normative discussion that might 
eventuate in a transformation of society and the radically different collective idea of 
the good life that might also incoiporate a qualitatively new relationship to the natural 
world. Moreover, there are no a priori considerations in discourse ethics that prevent 
the incorporation of concerns for other species and indeed the biosystem itself in a 
communicatively conceived idea of the good human life. Nor does discourse ethics
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exclude a priori that some advocates of non-anthi'opocentric ethics exhibit a moral 
sensibility that may prove to be correct moral intuition. But universal validity of their 
claims must remain a question of discursive evaluation of different conceptions of 
good and rival value orientations within the situational context.
It may be even said that the principles of discourse ethics must be aclmowledged, at 
least implicitly, by eveiy philosophical ethics, whatever its tenets may be. But, at the 
same time, it may be postulated that no school of philosophical ethics should suggest 
that, from its principles, it could deduce concrete situation-related norms of action. It 
rather should consider even its principles as proposals to be exposed to critical 
discussion on the level of those practical discourses where the interests of all 
concerned parties can be taken into account. Discourse ethics, however, does make an 
a priori claim that can be directly derived from its theoretical foundations. The claim 
concerns the principle that all possible members of the (in principle indefinite) 
argumentation community have equal rights in representing their interests as claims 
by arguments, either by pai'ticipating themselves in the discourse or, at least, by being 
represented by advocates. Immediately, it raises a question of whose interests should 
count, and whether non-human interest can be adequately represented in discourse.
And here should be emphasised once again that nothing in discourse ethics prevents 
the representation of non-human interests in normative discourse by good advocates 
analogous to advocacy of interests of those human beings who lack the 
communicative competence (e.g. severe brain-darnaged, the mentally ill, the senile
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etc.). Moreover, as Habermas himself notes, compassion and solidarity- with non­
humans as well as humans- do “appear in a discourse ethics that is consistently 
thought through to the end, at least as limit concepts” (Habermas, 1982).
This does not, however, imply that we are compelled to lift all living beings, or at 
least the higher animals, to the status of co-subjects in the communication community 
of rational beings. It has rather to be stated that a certain antlnopocentiic perspective 
that prima facie goes with the very notion of moral responsibility cannot and must not 
be eliminated from our advocacy for those living beings.
From this point of view the question of so called "animal rights" has to be tackled. 
Since the concept of ftmdamental "human rights" according to the presuppositions of 
discourse ethics can only be generated on the condition of a generalised reciprocity of 
responsibility, hence of rights and duties, not even higher animals can have rights in 
the sense of those claims which can be brought forward and defended by arguments 
on the level of human communication. But this does not mean that we humans - in 
practising as good advocates of the interests of animals - could not and should not 
take into careful consideration their “interests”, or even establish binding laws that 
lay down something like animal quasi-right (the correlates of our legal obligations to 
animals) with regard to the protection of those animal interests we have ascertained. 
But the concrete answers to these questions - e.g. with regard to how fai* we should go 
in our fixing moral and legal obligations to animals and which teims we should apply
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for the quasi-rights of non-human beings - have to be a concern in instituting practical 
discourses.
The discoiu'se-ethical approach to enviromnental responsibility, therefore, accepts 
environmentalists' demand for a novel ethics of responsibility that should provide 
adequate moral protection for the environment as a legitimate task. At the same time, 
by regarding that the proper nonns for regulating the relation between society and 
nature would follow from the commimicatively conceived idea of the human good 
life, it distances itself from calls for a radically novel, non-anthropocentric ethics. It 
does so not because it is “hopelessly antlnopocentiic” but rather because it seeks to 
defend the possibility of rational discussion of the good life and the goals of social 
development, without appealing to questionable epistemological, ontological and 
ethical commitments.
To sum up, the discourse ethical approach to environmental responsibility does not 
generate substantial moral noims and principles by which our treatment of natural 
environment ought to be guided, i.e. concrete, guiding rules on what, by whom and at 
which occasion, has to be done or, in the alternate, refrained from being done. It is 
based on belief that concrete norms and principles cannot be legitimately decided in 
advance of an actual argumentation or discourse among all concerned. That is to say, 
founding situational, material moral norms ought to be left to the affected parties 
who, thi’ough participation in real argumentation in given social and historical 
settings, freely and equally, and without constraint should assess the rational
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acceptability of any concrete moral norms or principles. Thus, on the presuppositions 
of discourse ethics one would not try to deduce concrete, universal principles for our 
treatment of nature, such as " We are no longer allowed to cause annihilation of any 
species of living beings by technical interventions into the natural environment”. But, 
at the same time, working from the presuppositions of discourse ethics, one would 
insist that we should have to bring forward good reasons for all our interventions into 
the natural environment. This rule is in accordance both with a novel attitude toward 
nature and with the demand of discourse ethics that the solution of all concrete, 
situation-related problems should be reached by practical discourses.
Thus, discourse ethics would have concrete practical consequences which - in the 
context of environmental questions - could be seen in the ethically based intention to 
create and secure fairer and uncoerced conditions for communication regarding 
environmental policies among all those affected by them. Discourse ethical approach 
would, therefore, work toward an institutional and methodological opening of 
processes which form environmental policy decisions.
This points to another dimension of this approach. Existing socio-economic and 
political structures determine existing environmental decision-making processes and 
resulting policy decisions. Who is able to participate in a decision-making process, 
and whose voices are expressed in the discourse are essential to the ethical character 
of the discursive process. As a normative model, discourse ethics offers the potential 
for making visible the hidden normative assumptions, behaviours, and motivations
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which influence existing decision-making processes. Ultimately, it points to the 
functional weakness of existing democratic decision-making procedures.
With regard to the question of non-anthropocentric ethics, it seems fair to conclude 
that the discourse-ethical approach, though it may remain “anthi'opocentric”, 
represents a very comprehensive and coherent perspective that allows one to address 
the full range of environmental concerns. In a sense, environmental problems can be 
seen as a practical catalyst for reflection on how the ways in which we currently treat 
nature are leading to a more and more frustrating and self-destructive way of life. 
This need not involve a new philosophy of nature, or a radically novel way of relating 
to nature. Rather, it requires enliancing the moral, practical, and aesthetic dimensions 
of everyday life, and a new sense of what makes human well-being.
The point that should be emphasised is that the discourse-ethical perspective on non- 
anthropocentric environmental ethics does not represent a rejection of a more 
ecological mode of ethics. It does, however, pose a challenge to show how one might 
be possible.
With tliis regard it is perhaps worth mentioning that some empirical studies of 
environmental concerns (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993; Stern & Dietz, 1994;) have 
shown that in the general public the distinctive non-anthiopocentric ethics, postulated 
in the theoretical literature on environmentalism, is not differentiated from a broadly 
conceived anthropocentric ethics. Stem and Dietz (1994), for instance, have
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concluded that the eco-centric ethical position, or in their tenninology “the biospheric 
value orientation” ...does not differentiate from social-altruism in a general public 
sample”. In Stern-Dietz conceptual framework “the social -altmistic” value 
orientation conesponds to the ethical position that we would mark as a universalistic 
type of (as yet anthropocentric) ethics such as discourse-ethics.
This, admittedly rather sketchy, empirical evidence might be interpreted in two 
different ways. On the one hand, as Stem and Dietz infer, it could mean that the 
proponents of “biospheric values” have not yet succeeded in generating a clear 
distinction in general public consciousness between valuing nature in itself and 
valuing nature because of the human benefits it provides, but that an ideological 
struggle, reflected in environmental wiitings, is imder way (Stern and Dietz, 1994). 
On the other hand, it could also mean that at least a modest antluopocentric 
perspective is inevitable, and that the non-anthiopocentric argument fails to take into 
account this modest antluopocentrism that goes with the very notion of ethical 
enteiprise. David Cooper thus reminds the advocates of non-anthropocentric ethics 
that “claims about the inherent value of nature, made in an anti-anthropocentric spirit, 
could never provide us with reasons to caie about nature, unless it could also be 
shown that so caring is implied by, or answers to, the ways in which we care about 
our own lives” (Cooper, 1995).
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However, as a concluding remark, it is worth recalling that there are not only 
prudential but also good ethical reasons for environmental protection. These ethical 
reasons become apparent, as Habermas (1993) has nicely put it,
“ ...once we ask ourselves seriously how, as members of a civilised global 
society, we want to live on this planet and how, as members of our own 
species, we want to treat other species. In certain respects, aesthetic reasons, 
have here even greater force than ethical, for in the aesthetic experience of 
nature, things withdraw into an unapproachable autonomy and inaccessibility; 
they then exhibit their fragile integrity so clearly that they strike us as 
inviolable in their own right and not merely as desirable elements of a 
preferred form of life.”
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Conclusions
The issue of environmental responsibility involves a number of moral problems that 
have to be solved. They range from the problems of responsibility related to thi eshold 
effects and cumulative or even synergistic harmftil consequences resulting from the 
imder-critical contributions of many single actors, to the questions of human 
responsibility to non-humans. The thesis has addressed these problems in two ways. 
Firstly, it has critically examined conventional ways of dealing with the problems, 
and secondly, it has developed an alternative, discourse-ethical approach.
With regard to the problems of environmental responsibility raised by collective 
actions, it has been demonstrated that the discourse-ethical approach, by grounding a 
conception of universal co-responsibility in commimicative rationality, overcomes 
limitations of strategic approaches and therefore offers a more appropriate conceptual 
framework for thinking about mechanisms of responsible co-ordination in collective 
actions. Through a critique of strategic models of collective action (the models that 
appear in different forms that stretch out from Hobbes’s version of social contract to 
the contemporary rational choice theory), the thesis has demonstrated that the 
questions of taking over and bearing co-responsibility for the environmental effects
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of collective actions pose an ethical problem that is by no means explained by the 
theoretical models based on strategic rationality (chapter 2).
It has been shown that the strategic models of collective action revolve around the 
same problem that was posed in its classical form by Hobbes as the question of how 
the convergence of the egocentric perspectives of self-interested actors could yield an 
aiTangement that encoui'aged individuals to consider the interest of others. In the 
enviromnental thinking, the problem was most famously captured by GaiTett Hardin’s 
metaphor of “the tragedy of the commons”. It has been acknowledged that the 
findings of the analysis of collective responsibility problems offered by the strategic 
models have important ethical implications, since they elucidate what sort of co­
operative action could be expected among individuals who shared an attachment to 
strategic rationality, however divergent their other basic values might be. Yet, the 
thesis has ai'gued that the strategic models aie flawed since they camiot explain how 
strategic actors are capable of stabilising their agreements solely on the basis of 
rational decisions motivated by self-interest. Additionally, it follows that these 
explanatory models are based on an unrealistic assumption that all social behaviour is 
strategic action and can thus be explained as thought it were the result of egocentric 
utility calculations. Hence, it has been concluded that the explanatory capabilities of 
these models are limited.
The limitations of strategic models have indicated that we need an additional 
mechanism of action co-ordination, i.e. not only the reciprocal influence exerted by
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actors oriented to success but also the communication among persons engaged in 
argmnent for the purposes of reaching understanding. This has required a recourse to 
a different concept of rationality, namely coimnunicative rationality. With the help of 
communicative rationality, a conception of universal co-responsibility has been 
grounded by reflection on pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation (chapter 4).
The thesis has argued that the novel demand for talcing over environmental 
responsibility cannot be dealt with satisfactorily within the conventional moral 
framework which only addresses the responsibility of single actors seen as private 
persons or of individuals in their professional roles within existing institutions. At 
issue here is a universalistic ethics in which the "internal morality", in many respects 
still taken for granted, would have to be transcended. It has been shown that this can 
be achieved by using the conception of post-conventional, universalistic ethics. The 
idea of post-conventional morality follows from the Piaget-Kohlberg tradition in 
developmental cognitive psychology, particularly from Kohlberg's "developmental 
logic" of moral consciousness, and it has been adopted here since it seems to have 
provided a general theoretical perspective on the possible and necessary transgression 
of the conventional morality (chapter 3).
Chapter 4 has shown that it is possible to ground a conception of post-conventional, 
universal responsibility (or rather co-responsibility) by strict reflection on the actual 
situation of practising communicative rationality. A philosophical analysis of the 
implicit meaning of the argumentative acts has shown that, in order to argue
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reasonably, one must accept a normative principle of trans-subjectivity that implies also 
a ftmdamental ethical norm of generalised reciprocity of right and duties. It has been 
demonstrated that this principle is nothing but a reflective explication of those 
normative contents that are inherent in human communication by speech.
The thesis has argued that, by participating in an ai'gumentative discourse within a real 
communication commimity, individuals have already anticipated the existence of an 
ideal community. Participants in argumentation are, so to speak, members of a real 
community of communication, and simultaneously members of an ideal communication 
community. It has been shown that the reason why this ideal communication 
community has to be presupposed lies in the fact that, by using arguments with claims 
for universal validity, one must transcend every particular community, and anticipate 
the judgement of an indefinite ideal audience, which alone could defmitevely 
understand and evaluate the universal validity claims. It is emphasised that this ideal 
communication commimity that is presupposed for the inspection and recognition of 
validity of claims to truth and rightness does not really exist and should be understood 
as merely a counterfactual anticipation or a regulative principle.
It has been shown that this dialectical double structure of the community presupposition 
provides foundations for a universal ethics that crosses both space and time boundaries. 
With the necessary anticipation of an unlimited, ideal community of communication, 
participants in argumentation have to recognise that, in principle, all valid solutions to 
problems - including especially the morally relevant solutions- would have to be
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acceptable to all members of the unlimited, ideal community of communication, if they 
were able to take part in the discussion. It has been argued that this implies that 
pailicipants in argumentation should consider not only interests of the members of the 
real community of commimication but also the interests of members of the unlimited 
community of communication. Although the latter cannot take place in discourses 
aimed to establish just and fair social aiTangements, consideration of their interests 
appeal's to be justified in two respects. In the first place, because of the coherence of all 
valid solutions to the problems, pai'ticipants in the real argumentation have to consider 
the interests of all potential members of the unlimited community of argumentation in 
the course of building a consensus. Secondly, because of the recognition of the 
fundamental equality of rights shared by all potential partners in discourse, they must 
now take responsibly into account the prospective problems and concerns of the 
members who will presumably exist someday.
The thesis has suggested that the transfer of this original co-responsibility towar d the 
answers to the novel task of environmental responsibility should be fulfilled by a 
network of formal and infonnal dialogues and other foi-ms of discursive 
environmental decision-making at all levels. By seeing public deliberation not merely 
as a mechanism for collective decision making but as a basic feature of practical 
rationality, the thesis has emphasised the importance of deliberative processes for 
environmental policy making. Thus, one of the conclusions of the thesis is that one 
should seek the conditions for a rational formation of environmental responsibility 
not only at the individual level of the value orientation and decisions of single actors
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but also at the social level of institutionalised process of deliberations and decision 
making. In an attempt to help in developing an alternative model of environmental 
decision-making which would be both environmentally sound and more democratic, 
the thesis has offered a simple normative model in tenns of an ideal procedure of 
deliberation and decision making. The procedure itself has been characterised in 
terms of postulates that should provide a normative framework for reaching binding 
decisions that lie in the equal interest of all.
As to the question of human responsibility to non-humans, the thesis has shown that 
there is no consensus among philosophers whether we need a new, non- 
anthropocentric ethics, or whether the modified versions of familiar moral theories 
can deal with the issue (chapter 6). The thesis has contributed to the debate on 
environmental ethics by constructing the discourse-ethical position regarding the 
question of non-antliropocentric environmental ethics (chapter 7). This work has 
rejected the claim that the discoui'se-ethical approach is unable to incorporate the 
interests of non-humans into its framework in any meaningful way because it is based 
on language as a human expression. It has been shown that there are no a priori 
considerations in discourse ethics that prevent the incoiporation of concerns for other 
species and, indeed, the biosystem itself in a communicatively conceived idea of the 
good human life. On the other hand, by defending the possibility of rational 
discussion of the good life and by specifying normative prerequisites for it, the 
discursive approach opens space for a normative discussion that might eventuate in a
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transformation of society and the radically different collective idea of the good life 
that might also incorporate a qualitatively new relationship with the natural world.
At the same time, by regarding that the proper norms for regulating the relation 
between society and nature would follow from the communicatively conceived idea 
of the human good life, this approach distances itself from those positions that 
advocate a radically novel, non-anthiopocentric ethics. Thus, it has been concluded 
that the discourse-ethical approach, while it may be characterised as 
“anthropocentric”, nevertheless represents a comprehensive perspective on the issue 
of human responsibility to non-humans, and provides us with valuable insights into 
the nature of this complex issue.
As a general conclusion, it seems fair to claim that the discourse-ethical approach to 
environmental responsibility has offered a comprehensive and coherent perspective 
that allowed us to address the whole range of environmental concerns. It has provided 
us with analytical tools and the conceptual framework to deal with the ftill range of 
philosophical and moral-political issues of enviromnental responsibility in a broad yet 
clear and efficient way. By insisting on creation of fairer and uncoerced conditions 
for commimication regarding environmental policies among all those affected by 
them, the discourse-ethical approach has implied that there is potential for 
improvement of existing democratic decision-making procedures. By offering 
standards for evaluating existing institutional arrangements it has indicated a way of
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developing practices and institutional designs of modem society which would be both 
environmentally sound and more democratic.
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